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ABSTRACT

Agricultural topsoil is one of the critical natural resoiu-ces of a civilization. This delicate layer
of our planet is the primary somce of sustenance for human and animal populations. Arable soil is
necessary to feed, clothe, and shelter human beings and is a prerequisite for achieving the aspirations
of a society. Without adequate arable land, a civilization will find it difficult to thrive, or even survive
(Browning; Napier and Forster). Thus, the potential of a society is largely dependent upon the topsoil
of its agricultural lands (Napier and Forster).

While the importance of topsoil and the problem of topsoil loss have long been recognized, over

40 years of cooperative efforts between farmers and the federal government have done little to check
the erosion of our farmland (McConnell; Napier and Forster; Rasmussen, 1982; Walker). One-third
of U.S. cropland topsoil has been lost in the last 200 years (Walker), and sheet and rill erosion on U.S.
cropland continues at a rate of 1.6 billion tons annually(USDA/SCS, 1990).
Increased public awareness of these issues continues to put significant pressure on policymakers

to solve our environmental problems while maintaining an abundant, inexpensive food supply. Policy
debates, past and present, have focused primarily on physical actions to be taken rather than upon policy
goals(Robinson, K.). The primary target for such policy is the T"level, the "maximum aimual number
of tons of soil an acre of land can lose indefinitely without impairing the agricultural productivity of the

soil" (Crosson, p. 34).
Yet the use of physical goals of soil loss is often challenged by economists who argue that it is

not the physical loss from the farm that is important, but the costs incurred by loss of topsoil and offsite
damages from agriculturally-generated sedimentation (Robinson, K.). Of the two, offsite sediment

damages are far greater than onsite productivity damages. After modeling onsite damages of soil
erosion, McConnell (p. 88) concluded "the major impact of soil erosion is water pollution," and "the

problem of water pollution is paramount, not agriculture's future productive capacity." Similarly,
Swanson's research in Illinois indicated that the impact ofsoil erosion on agricultural productive capacity
is small.

The costs to society of offsite damages,however,are significant. Sediment is the largest polluter

of ponds, streams, rivers and reservoirs (Clark, et al.; Miller and Everett; Wade and Heady, Water
Resources Council). Sediment trapped in ditches and lakes reduces water holding capacity and increases
the likelihood of flooding. It increases dredging costs of rivers and harbors, fills reservoirs, damages
wildlife habitats and diminishes the recreational enjoyment of water resources. The annual offsite cost
of erosion in the United States is estimated to be $6.2 billion (Clark, et al.).

Kenneth Robinson (p. 153) states "a shift away from emphasizing physical targets to the use of
economic criteria (or some combination of the two) probably would lead to greater returns to society
from the dollars currently invested in conservation activities." This study focuses on combining economic
and physical relationships to develop a workable policy model to optimize both agricultural revenues and
environmental quality.

The specific objective of this study is to develop a soil conservation policy model that
incorporates both physical and economic criteria, and that includes the objectives of both producers and
policymakers. The model used is an adaptation of the multi-level programming model developed by

Candler and Norton and extended by Sylvia and Anderson. A multi-level optimal control model is
developed which optimizes the producer's dynamic problem in the first stage, then uses the producer's
optimal decision paths in the second stage as components of the policymakers' dynamic problem. The

second stage problem utilizes weights indicating the relative importance of the policymaker's competing
goals. Those weights are used to construct a dynamic policy frontier demonstrating the relationships

between various policy goals and the resulting optimal solution paths.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Agricultural topsoil is one of the critical natural resoiuces of a civilization. This delicate layer
of our planet is the primary source of sustenance for human and animal populations. Arable soil is
necessary to feed, clothe, and shelter human beings and is a prerequisite for achieving the aspirations
of a society. Without adequate arable land a civilization will find it difficult to thrive, or even survive

(Browning; Napier and Forster). Thus, the potential of a society is largely dependent upon the topsoil
of its agricultural lands (Napier and Forster).

While the importance of topsoil and the problem of topsoil loss have long been recognized,
more than 40 years of cooperative efforts between farmers and the federal government have done little
to check the erosion of our farmland (McConnell; Napier and Forster, Rasmussen, 1982; Walker). Onethird of U.S. cropland topsoil has been lost in the last 200 years (Walker), and sheet and rill erosion on
U.S. cropland continues at a rate of 1.6 billion tons armually(USDA/SCS, 1990).

HISTORY OF SOIL CONSERVATION

Early Recognition of Soil Loss

Recognition of soil erosion in the United States dates back more than two and a half centuries
to the time when the U.S. was a group of British colonies(Browning; Rasmussen, 1982). In the middle
eighteenth century, Jared Eliot wrote of the dangers of "soil washing" and urged farmers to rotate
clovers and grasses in cropland (Eliot). Both George Washington and Thomas Jefferson recognized the

problem and recommended better management practices including crop rotations, use of clover, and
contom plowing (Browning; Rasmussen, 1975; Rasmussen, 1982).

Some Americans continued to speak out about the dangers of soil erosion throughout the

nineteenth century. John Lorain and John Taylor urged erosion control, stating that repeated planting
of row crops on the same land was the chief cause of erosion (Rasmussen, 1975). In the middle
nineteenth century, Edmund Ruffin conducted experiments in the use of marl' to control erosion.
Ruffin's procedures were successful and others began to adopt his methods, but external pressures for
increased production diverted the attention of farmers from soil conservation for almost three-quarters
of a century (Rasmussen, 1982).

The primary cause of these pressmes was the Civil War. Labor was scarce and demand for
food products was high. The resulting high prices created a shift from hiunan to animal power on the
farm and a westward population expansion. The passage of the Homestead Act of 1862 launched the
first agricultural revolution on this continent (Rasmussen, 1982). Following the Civil War, the pressure

for increased production continued as farmers tried to pay off debts created by increased technology and
land expansion.

These pressures, both diuing the war and after, resulted in production being placed before
conservation. Some were aware of the problem, however, and tried to urge farmers to conserve soil.
An 1894 United States Department of Agriculture bulletin entitled. Washed Soils: How to Prevent and
Reclaim Them, noted that thousands of acres of useful but eroded cropland were abandoned each year

(Rasmussen,1982). Two 1910 United States Department of Agriculture bulletins.Soil Conservation and
Com Cultivation, advised farmers that soil conservation was vital to the continued productivity of their
land (Rasmussen, 1982).

Despite farmers' unwillingness to sacrifice current production for future productivity, a
movement in academic and political circles was beginning to form. In 1914, M. F. Miller of the

University of Missouri conducted the first comprehensive experiments trying to determine the nature
of erosion. He collected runoff in concrete tanks to measure and characterize the resulting soils

'Marl is a mixture of day and carbonate of lime. Ruffm primarily used this in the form of fossil shells.
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(Browning). In 1928, a United States Department of Agriculture bulletin entitled. Soil Emsion: A
National Menace, was published in which the author, Hugh Hammond Bennett, declared soil erosion
to be a national problem. He stated, "our population may feel acutely the evil effects of this scourge
of the land, now largely imrestrained" (Rasmussen, 1975). One year later, following pressure from
Bennett and others. Congress passed an amendment to the Agricultmal Appropriations Act of 1930

allncating $160,000 to Study soil erosion, its cause, and its control. Bennett was placed in charge of the

program which established ten regional soil erosion experiment stations. This was the beginning of soil
and water conservation research as we know it today (Baker, et al.).

Evolution of Modem Soil Conservation Policy

The Soil Erosion Service was established as a branch of the Department of the Interior in 1933.

This new agency established cooperative research projects with many state agricultural colleges. Two

years later, it was transferred to the Department of Agriculture. Congress passed the Soil Conservation
Act that same year which permanently established the soil conservation program and renamed the old
Soil Erosion Service the Soil Conservation Service.

The dustbowl era of the early 1930's helped to focus public attention on the problem of erosion,
and for the first time farmers were actively involved in soil conservation activities on a large scale.

Between 1935 and 1947, all the states passed legislation setting up soil conservation districts to assist
farmers in conservation efforts. The Soil Conservation Service sent experts into these local offices to
disseminate the information gathered through research at the experiment stations.

The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 provided for the control of agricultural production
to meet demand, but this provision was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1936

(Rasmussen,1982). In the meantime,the Soil Conservation Service was developing a plan to encomage

farmers to volimtarily shift production from erosive crops to soil-conserving cover such as legumes and
grasses. Farmers would receive soil-conserving payments for shifting from erosive to non-erosive crops,
and soil-building payments for enacting soil-building practices on cropland or pasture. In 1936, Congress

adopted such a plan in the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. Known as the Agricultural
Conservation Program, this plan provided the dual benefits of reducing erosion and controlling excess

production. The Agricultiual Conservation Program,in some form, has persisted to this day as a major
soil conservation policy tool.

The Agricultural Conservation Program, however, has not been without its critics. Early in the

program, cost sharing was provided for production-oriented as well as for conservation-oriented
improvements. During the early 1950's,the Secretary of Agriculture attempted to eliminate productionoriented practices from the program. Those efforts failed, yet the momentum for such reform continued
until achieving success near the end of the 1970's. The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 specified,
"eligibility for assistance under the Agricultural Conservation Program would be based upon the
existence of a conservation or environmental problem that reduced the productive capacity of land and
water resources or caused environmental degradation" (Rasmussen, 1982). The move away from

supporting production-oriented practices was finalized in 1980 with new United States Department of
Agriculture regulations,"that cost-sharing will not be used for carrying out measures and practices that
are primarily production oriented or that have little or no conservation or pollution benefits"
(USDA/ASCS).

While the Agricultural Conservation Program was under fire in the 1950*s, Congress was

developing a new approach to supply-control and conservation policy. The Soil Bank Program,

established by the Agricultural Act of 1956, provided for control of excess production and soil erosion
by removing large amounts of land from agricultural production. The program was composed of two
distinct provisions: the acreage reserve and the conservation reserve.

The acreage reserve provision was designed to reduce the acreage planted in allotment crops

such as wheat, cotton and com. Under this program, farmers received payments for diverting acreage

from these crops to conservation cover. By 1957, the acreage reserve enrolled 21.4 million acres
(Rasmussen, 1982).

The conservation reserve provision was open to all fanners who would contract to place their

cropland into conservation usage for up to ten years. In 1960, 28.6 million acres were placed in the
conservation reserve of the Soil Bank Program (Rasmussen and Baker). One criticism of the
conservation reserve was that the tendency of some farmers to enter entire farms into the program

caused hardship for rural communities economically dependent upon farming. The last conservation
reserve contracts under the Soil Bank Program were issued in 1960. From the end of the Soil Bank
Program until the middle of the 1980's, conservation policy was once again primarily governed through
Soil Conservation Service programs and the Agricultural Conservation Program (Rasmussen, 1982).

As if in prelude to the changes that would take place in 1985, the late 1970's brought significant
research resources to bear on the soil conservation problem. The Soil and Water Resources

Conservation Act of 1977(RCA)directed the United States Department of Agriculture to appraise the
status of the nation's soil, water and related resources and to prepare a program for furthering the

conservation of these resources (Rasmussen, 1982). The Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation
Service was directed by the president to review and evaluate the Agricultural Conservation Program.
The Soil Conservation Service conducted the 1977 National Resources Inventory on the use and quality
of our nation's land. The Water Resources Council published its second National Water Assessment

in 1978, and in 1979 the National Agricultural Lands Study was set up to study the conversion of

agricultural land to nonagricultural uses. While these studies varied somewhat in detail, they all agreed
that substantial amounts of land suffer from serious erosion and that the potential exists for even more
serious problems in the future (Rasmussen, 1982; USDA/ASCS; USDA/SCS, 1989).

The Food Security Act of 1985 represented some major changes in farm legislation. While
previous farm bills have tended to define farm support levels precisely, this bill provided significant
discretionary power to the Secretary of Agricultiue to make such determinations. It also demonstrated
a movement toward the consideration of broad social goals as well as those arising from the farm sector.
Subtitle XII of the act addresses soil and water conservation issues through three specific programs: the

Agricultural Conservation Program, the Conservation Reserve Program, and the Conservation

Compliance Provision. These programs have been continued or expanded in the Food, Agriculttire,
Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990.

The Agricultural Conservation Program, as previously discussed, has been in existence in some
form since the 1930's. The program provides for cost sharing with farmers in implementing conservation

and protection practices on agricultural land. Practices eligible for technical and cost sharing assistance
include conservation cropping systems, water diversion and containment, wildlife protection and
enhancement, and forest-timber protection and maintenance (Thompson, et al.).

The Conservation Reserve Program is conceptually similar to the conservation reserve provision
of the Soil Bank Program of the 1950's. The stated objectives of the program are to (a) reduce water
and wind erosion, (b) protect our long-term capability to produce food and fiber, (c) reduce

sedimentation,(d)improve water quality,(e)create better habitat for fish and wildlife through improved
food and cover,(f) curb production of surplus commodities, and (g) provide needed income support for
farmers (Reichelderfer and Boggess). Farmers are encouraged to discontinue intensive use of highly
erodible cropland and convert the land to permanent vegetative cover through placement of land into
the Conservation Reserve Program through a bid mechanism. Annual payments of up to $50,000 per

farm per year are administered through the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. Cost
sharing is also available for establishment of permanent vegetative cover (Thompson, et al.).
Eligibility of cropland for the Conservation Reserve is limited to highly erodible cropland on

which crops have been grown at least two years out of the past five. To be considered highly erodible,
cropland must have an erodibility index greater than or equal to eight for wind or water erosion, and

must have produced erosion rates greater or equal to "T* while cropped. The erodibility index, a
measure of the inherent potential of a soil to erode, is based on soil type, slope, rainfall, and wind

exposure (Thompson, et al.). For a field to be entered in the Conservation Reserve Program, at least
two-thirds of the field must be highly erodible by these criteria.

The current Conservation Reserve Program addresses one of the concerns generated by the old

Soil Bank program in that it limits the amount of land that may be entered in the reserve within any

one county to 25 percent of the total cropland (FSA85). This provision reduces the potential for
economic hardship within the rural community as a result of the program.

The Conservation Compliance Provision was enacted, in part, to reduce sediment from erosion

and to improve water quality. This provision discourages production of crops on highly erodible
cropland. Where highly erodible cropland comprises more than one-third of a field, the farm operator
must develop an annual conservation cropping system plan. The plan must be developed by 1990 and

fully implemented by 1995. Failure to develop and implement such a plan results in the ineligibility of
the farmer for (a) any type of price support payment,(b) farm storage facility loans,(c) federal crop

insurance,(d) federal disaster payments, (e) Farmer's Home Administration loans, or (f) payments
through the Commodity Credit Corporation (FSA of 1985). The Conservation Compliance Provision
represents the first time that Congress has tied soil and water conservation directly to eligibility for other
agricultural programs.

Current and past policies have been oriented toward keeping soil in place through changes in
land use. Such policies have not been designed to consider the cost of erosion to society.

THE EROSION AND SEDIMENTATION PROCESS

Sediment is a product of soil erosion. Its sources include croplands, grass lands, forests,
construction sites, surface mines, roadways, urban areas, stream channels, incised valleys, and active

gullies (Robinson, A.). Sedimentation is a function of soil erosion, land characteristics between the
erosion site and the stream, and stream transport chEuacteristics. Sediment follows a downstream course

in waterways, slowly moving toward the oceans. Eroded soil generally moves small distances, perhaps
as little as a few meters each year (Robinson, A.), so that sediment generated in a watershed is only a
fraction of total erosion.

Figure 1.1 shows the determinant factors of the sedimentation process and their
interrelationships. Sediment delivery determines the amount of manmade erosion that actually reaches
the streambed as sediment while sediment transport determines the movement of that sediment wthin
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Figure 1.1. The sedimentation process.

the water system as well as natural erosion of stream banks which occurs without human intervention.
The principal engine of the sedimentation process is erosion. The degree of erosion on given land is
a function of the potential ability of water to cause erosion and the vulnerability of the soil to erosion.

The frequency and force of rainfall and the slope and area of the land contribute to the potential of
water to cause erosion. In addition, the ability of soil to absorb water is a major factor. Non-absorbent
soil is more likely to erode than absorbent soil. The vulnerability of the soil to erosion is influenced by
the specific properties of the soil itself and by management practices of the land in question. Such
factors as vegetative cover and physical modifications to the land can have a significant effect on erosion.

As shown in Figure 1.1, there are also interrelationships between many of the specific elements of the
erosion process. Soil properties and management affect the ability of the soil to absorb water, and land
modification affects both that ability and the slope and area of the land. However, not all eroded soil
will become sediment. Once erosion has occurred,the topographical characteristics of the land between
the erosion site and the waterway will determine how much, if any, of that soil reaches a waterway.
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After soil reaches the stream, the sediment transport system determines the movement and

impacts of the sediment. Depending upon the specific stream hydrology, the movement may be
relatively fast or extremely slow. Such factors as water flow, width of the stream, and streambed and
bank composition will determine the pace with which sediment moves downstream. In addition, artificial
barriers may impede movement of sediment or stop it altogether. Manmade lakes, artificial
embankments, and dams can act as collection sites for sediment that may otherwise have continued
downstream.

The costs of erosion may be categorized in two broad classifications: onsite and offsite. The

loss of topsoil from the land itself reduces the productivity of the land, requiring the farmer to substitute
other inputs such as fertilizer to maintain production. These onsite costs may take the form of lower
production, the cost of fertilizer application, or the cost of adopting production practices that prevent
or reduce erosion. Offsite costs result from the sediment in waterways. These costs include damages

fi-om the presence of the physical sediment as well as from chemicals and nutrients carried into the
waterway by the sediment. Offsite costs of erosion are significantly greater than onsite costs
(McConnell; Swanson, 1979).

Once eroded soil has reached the water as sediment, offsite damages of some type will be

incurred. The only way to prevent sedimentation and its related damages, therefore, is to focus policies
at or below the soil erosion or topographical characteristics levels of Figure 1.1. A dose examination
of the figure will indicate that soil management is the only determinant of soil erosion which may be
readily controlled. Sharp and Bromley remind us, "it is the practices of plowing, fertilizing, harvesting,

and manure spreading that provide the inputs into a process which is essentially driven by hydrological
phenomena"(p.593). Controls may be plant-based through crop rotations, or shifting of highly erodible
land to less erosive uses; residue-based through methods such as conservation tillage, ridge tillage, or

no till; or structure-based through such practices as contouring or terracing. Some control also may be
exerted at the topographical characteristics level. An example of such control is that of grass filter strips
bordering streams. These buffer the erosion, trapping soil before it reaches the waterway. Practices

that reduce total erosion, rather than just the movement of eroded soil, have the added benefit of
reducing both onsite and offsite erosion costs.

THE SOIL EROSION PROBLEM TODAY

Increased public awareness of the soil erosion problem continues to put significant pressure on

policymakers to solve our enviromnental problems while maintaining an abundant, inexpensive food
supply. Policy debates, past and present, have focused primarily on physical actions to be taken rather
than upon policy goals and objectives(Robinson, K.). The primary target for such policy is the T"level,
the "maximum annual number of tons of soil an acre of land can lose indefinitely without impairing the

agricultural productivity of the soil" (Crosson, p. 34).

Yet the use of physical goals of soil loss is often challenged by economists who argue that it is
not the physical loss from the farm that is important, but the costs incurred by loss of topsoil and offsite
damages from agriculturally-generated sedimentation (Robinson, K.). Of the two, offsite sediment
damages are far greater than onsite productivity damages. After modeling onsite damages of soil
erosion, McConnell (p. 88) concluded "the major impact of soil erosion is water pollution," and "the
problem of water pollution is paramount, not agriculture's future productive capacity." Similarly,

Swanson's (1979) research in Illinois indicated that the impact of soil erosion on agricultmal productive
capacity is small.
The costs to society of offsite damages, however, are significant. Sediment is the largest polluter
of ponds,streams, rivers and reservoirs (Clark, et al.; Miller and Everett; Wade and Heady, 1977; Water

Resources Council). Sediment trapped in ditches and lakes reduces water holding capacity and increases

the likelihood of flooding. It increases dredging costs of rivers and harbors, fills reservoirs, damages

wildlife habitats and diminishes recreational enjoyment of water resomces. The annual offsite cost of
erosion in the United States is estimated to be $6.2 billion (Clark, et al.).
Kenneth Robinson states "a shift away from emphasizing physical targets to the use of economic
criteria (or some combination of the two) probably would lead to greater returns to society from the
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dollars currently invested in conservation activities" (p. 153). Recently, more attention has been paid
to combining the economic and physical components of agricultural pollution problems. For example,
the Conservation Compliance Provision of the Food Security Act of 1985 was originally to be
administered under the Basic Conservation Systems requirements as indicated in local Soil Conservation
Service Field Office Technical Guides. The Basic Conservation Systems criteria emunerate conservation
practices that are considered to adequately control cropland erosion (Thompson, et al.). However,the
state conservationist has been granted authority to establish less stringent Alternative Conservation

Systems where soil types, economic conditions, social customs, religious beliefs, or managerial abilities
prevent the adoption of Basic Conservation Systems (Thompson, et al.).
The

adoption

of

Alternative

Cost

Conservation Systems indicates recognition of the
economic relationship between erosion control
C.

and costs. The erosion control/cost relationship,
as shown in Hgure 1.2, has been both

theoretically and empirically established(Braden,
Ci

et al.; Ervin, et aL; McConnell; Moffitt, et al.;

C,
E,

Park and Sawyer; Saygideger, et al.; Taylor and

E.

El
Erosion Rato

Frohberg). At high erosion rates, the unit cost Figure 12. Cost curve for erosion reduction,
of reducing erosion may be very small while the
unit cost of a reduction at lower levels may be prohibitively expensive. A reduction from E,to Ej in

Figure 1.2 will cost (Cj - C,), while a reduction from E2 to Ej will cost (C3 - C^).
Given two farms, both producing erosion at rate E3, a farm for which T" is Ej may be

economically able to meet the Basic Conservation Systems requirements while another farm for which
"T" is Ej may be unable to meet the requirement and remain in production. In the latter case, the farm
would be likely to withdraw from federal programs altogether rather than cease production.

Presumably, the farmer would continue to create erosion at Ej. Under Alternative Conservation
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Systems, however, the fanner may be allowed to reduce the erosion rate to Ejalthough it does not meet
the "T* standard. Society gains the benefit of some erosion reduction rather than none.
This illustration demonstrates the contrast between physical and economic policy. The physical

policy which considers only the actual T* value may well result in less reduction, through

nonpartidpation, than the economic policy. Economic policy, by recognizing the increasing marginal
cost of erosion control, can come doser to optimizing both private and public expenditures.

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

This study focuses on combining economic and physical relationships to develop a workable
policy model to optimize both agricultural revenues and environmental quality. The specific objective
of this study is to develop a soil conservation policy model, incorporating the objectives of both

producers and policymakers, that: 1) estimates the economic transfers between agricultural producers
and sodety resulting from agricultural production and its assodated sediment-based externalities, and
2) estimates a sodally optimal level of taxation, given varying levels of perceived importance to sodety
of agriculture versus environmental quality. The model used is an adaptation of the multi-level

programming model developed by Candler and Norton and extended by Sylvia and Anderson. A multi
level optimal control model is developed which optimizes the producer's dynamic problem in the first
stage, then uses the producer's optimal dedsion paths in the second stage as components of the
policymakers' dynamic problem. The second stage problem utilizes weights indicating the relative
importance of the policymaker's competing goals. Those weights are used to construct a dynamic policy

frontier demonstrating the relationships between various policy goals and the resulting optimal solution
paths.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

MODEL STRUCTURE IN SOIL CONSERVATION RESEARCH

The last two decades have brought significant research efforts to bear on the problem of soil
erosion. This may have been partially triggered by the agricultural output expansion of the 1970's and
the resulting increase in erosion (McConnell). Yet there is little evidence that either research or
government assistance programs have significantly reduced erosion on cropland in production. Lee
states that increasing soil losses are "intensifying air and water pollution problems and reducing the
productivity potential of... cropland" (p. 1070).

Several theories have been proposed to explain why farmers continue to tolerate erosion on

their cropland. Burt suggests that farmers do not act to prevent erosion because they can substitute
other inputs for soil depth. This relationship is also modeled by McConnell who concludes that the
optimal policy for the farmer may include exhaustion of the topsoil. Wade and Heady (1979) propose

that conservation practices are not adopted because "even though the practices may provide higher long
run profits ... the savings are simply not worth the change .. ."(p. 1281). Renard, et al. suggest
"farmers are simply too busy with the many other problems"(p. 1278).
The contrast between conservationists' objectives and farmers' actions suggests market failure.

Wade and Heady (1979) recognize two externalities from soil erosion,"potentially reduced agricultural
production capacity and the pollution of the eroded soil" (p. 1281). Most modeling efforts to date,
regardless of model structure, have addressed one or both of these externalities.
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Mathematical Programming Models

Numerous mathematical programming models have addressed the problem of soil erosion in
the last two decades. These models offer imparalleled flexibility in addressing a wide variety of
problems. Mathematical programming models are useful for examining any problem which involves

optimizing one or more objectives while recognizing given resource constraints.

Mathematical

programming models used in soil erosion research have evolved from linear programming models to
associated forms such as separable, dynamic or quadratic programming. All of these forms are still in
use in applied conservation research today.

The late 1970's and early 1980's saw the development of several large linear programming

models used in erosion control research. Taylor and Frohberg used a large Unear programming model
of crop production in the corn belt to estimate the partial welfare effects of alternative environmental

controls. The environmental controls included erosion control, banning of insecticides or herbicides,

and limiting nitrogen application. The model estimated consumer and producer surplus but did not
consider the environmental benefits of such control policies. Wade and Heady (1977) used a similar

model to examine the management changes which might be required to implement several hypothetical
erosion control policies. English and Heady used two large-scale linear programming models to
compare the short-nm and long-run effects of various erosion control measures. Policy implementation
was simulated by restricting soil loss to multiples of the T* level. The results indicated that farmers

may well make decisions based upon short-run cost-price pressures rather than upon long-run soil
conservation concerns. Osteen and Seitz used a linear programming model to predict regional

production shifts which might occur with the implementation of erosion control policies, and English
used a large linear programming model to ex£unine several levels of allowed soil loss and project the
impacts of each to the year 2030.

In other studies, linear programming models were used in a less straightforward way or for less

straightforward purposes. Moffitt, et al. used linear programming as the basis for their model which
compared the efficiency of taxes to emissions standards in pollution control. Horner used a multi-period
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linear programming modcl to optimize returns subject to given nitrogen emissions standards for an
infinite, planning horizon. Miller and Everett examined the economic impact of controlling sediment
loss through changing forest management practices. They used a two-stage model in which a linear
programming component first optimized management strategies, then used the results as input to an
input/output model to examine the regional impacts of such changes.

Though not as prevalent as linear programming, other mathematical programming techniques
have also been used to study erosion problems. Although the exact algorithm varies, a common theme

was the examination of multiple simultaneous objectives. Frohberg and Swanson used a dynamic
programming model to determine the optimum rate of soil erosion in one watershed in Illinois. By
including sediment damage in the model, they were able to consider simultaneously both crop

production and sedimentation from soil erosion. Boggess and Heady used a separable programming
model to analyze the potential of alternative policies to achieve simultaneously the dual goals of
increased farm income and reduced soil erosion. This study focussed on land retirement as a tool for
reducing erosion. Kramer,et al. used a quadratic programming model to examine the influence of risk
on farm-level soil conservation decisions.

The model allowed the simultaneous consideration of

uncertainty in revenues and input supplies. In still a more complex framework, Schatzer, et al. used a

hybrid Econometric/Tatonnement programming model to approximate equilibrium prices and quantities
of agricultural commodities for the year 2000. Although an examination of soil loss was not the primary

purpose of the study, erosion factors were integral to the model and could well be addressed through
such methodology.

Mathematical Models

Many researchers have modeled soil conservation using static or dynamic neoclassical economic
models. Eleveld and Halcrow defined a Pareto-optimal framework in which they maximized net social
income under a variety of conditions. They began with the case of no resomce depletion or offsite
damages and progressed to the case in which both resource depletion and offsite damages were present.
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While the model explicitly considered time, it was more of a static model than dynamic. The objective
function of the model was summed over time and discounted, but the effect of one production period
on the next was not modeled. Reichelderfer and Boggess used a neoclassical model in which a decisionmaker's utility was maximized as a function of various competing objectives. The Conservation Reserve

Program was analyzed for alternative bid selection criteria. Sharp and Bromley developed a multilevel
neoclassical constrained optimization model in which both producer and policymaker objectives are

simultaneously optimized. The producer sought to optimize profit while the policymaker optimized
water quality. The model was static, however, and did not provide for the policymaker to assign value
to agricultural production as well as water quality.

Dynamic models have tended to concentrate on onsite effects of soil erosion rather than offsite
effects. Van Kooten, et al. used a dynamic Markov decision model to develop a trade-off function
between the various objectives of the farmer. The model examined how optimal management practices
are affected by varying levels of concern for stewardship. This model of Canadian agriculture did not
consider the imposition of conservation policy by the government. Walker developed a dynamic model
comparing conventional farming to conservation practices in their effects on onsite soil loss damage.
The model sought to determine the point at which farmers would adopt conservation practices in
response to decreasing soil depth and productivity. McConnell introduced soil depth and soil loss into
an optimal control model of agricultural production to determine when the private path of erosion
differs from the socially optimal path. The study mdicated that a farmer may rationally choose to
produce in such a manner as to deplete soil resources. Both Walker and McConnell restricted their

research to onsite effects of erosion. It is quite possible that the results of McConnell's study would
have been significantly different if external costs were internalized to the farmer.

DEVELOPING A SOIL EROSION POLICY MODEL

The research reviewed here demonstrates the extensive literature on the regulation of watershed
resources. The dominant analytical styles in the research include both conditional and optimization
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analyses. Conditional analyses examine a set of assumed parameters and policy variables to determine
the results of such conditions. Optimization analyses seek to determine the most efficient use of
resources without necessarily making a priori determinations of the level of policy involvement. Many
research efforts contain elements of both. A basic premise of this work is that several specific elements
are necessary for the development of a soil erosion policy modeL Those elements include modeling(1)
the interaction of producer and policymaker (Anderson and Lee; Candler, et al.; Candler and Norton;
Sharp and Bromley, Sylvia and Anderson),(2) the dynamic nature of the sedimentation process (Ervin,
et al.; Rausser, 1980; Swanson, 1982), and (3) the recognition of multiple, competing goals of the
policymaker (Rausser and Yassour; Sylvia and Anderson; Van Kooten, et al.).
None of the reviewed models included all of these elements. This study is intended to develop

a modeling framework which does. The following sections examine each of these elements and their
particular contribution to a erosion policy model.

Interaction of Producer and Policymaker

Multi-level Models

While a production model may examine the optimal choices of a single decision-making
producer, a model of policy regulation must consider both the producer and the policymaker. Sharp

and Bromley state "the essence of efficient policy for dealing with agricultural pollution, where efGdency
comprehends not only least-cost abatement at the firm level but also the allocation of scarce public

funds, is that of coordinating the actions of two primary actors: the agricultural firm and the
management agency"(p.594). Anderson and Lee point out that research on regulatory policy designed

to correct open-access market failure usually examines only the optimal level of pollutant released into
a watershed. Models are built with production of the pollutant as the control variable. Yet the
policymaker does not have direct control over production of pollutant. He has control only over the
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regulatory instrument itself. Thus, the control variable for the producer is production, but the control
variable for the policymaker is the governing instrument.

This difference is based not only upon the actual instrument under control by each actor, but

by the underlying dichotomy between their goals and objectives. The goal of the producer is frequently
assumed by economists to be profit maximization (Van Kooten, et al.; Henderson and Quandt). The
goal of policy analysts is to develop economic policy instruments consistent with the public interest.
Such instruments must attempt to reconcile the differing values and objectives of a variety of user groups
and then provide the means for implementing chosen objectives (Robadue, et al.).

A recently developed modeling approach which explicitly recognizes these needs is multilevel

programming. Developed by Candler and Norton in 1977, multi-level programming is intended to
optimize a system of "two separate decision makers in hierarchical relationship, each wath his own
objective function and control over distinct but interacting variables" (Candler, et al.).

This concept would appear to hold significant potential for applied policy analysis, yet Candler,
et aL found less than satisfactory results in attempting to analytically or numerically solve empirical
problems. They state "the two-level nature of most policy problems mean that they are not generally

amenable to solution by mathematical programming. Furthermore, solutions obtained by dint of
ignoring the behavioral, or lower level, decision function are likely to be seriously misleading." Candler,
et al. contrast multi-level programming with optimal control theory, stating that "control theory deals
with a dynamic system while multi-level programming deals with a static equilibrium." While true, they
neglected to consider the possibility of combining a multi-level analysis with optimal control theory to
solve dynamic policy problems.

This was later accomplished by Sylvia and Anderson, who developed an analytical system for
net-pen aquaculture development. No empirical work was performed, but the framework was

established for the practical use of multi-level optimal control models. Another benefit of this type of
model is the ability to develop a solution independent of policy goals. Accordingly, an optimal policy
frontier may be developed to demonstrate the tradeoffs between different policy goals. This approach
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"does not require the prior articulation of policy preferences, and by parameterizing on policy goals it
allows policy frontiers to be generated which provide a conHguration of tradeoffs and policy options
suitable for use by decision makers and other policy actors"(Sylvia and Anderson, p. 2). The multi-level
optimal control approach is the basis for the model developed in this dissertation.

Taxes as a Policy Instrument

Taxes have been studied extensively as a policy instrument for internalizing external costs arising

from nattiral resource use, yet they have not been implemented in any agricultural setting. Virtually all
environmentally-oriented agricultural policy to date has involved the use of subsidies and cost-sharing
to encourage environmentally sound behavior. The Agricultural Conservation Program provides cost-

sharing with fjumers who choose to make conservation-oriented improvements to their land. The
Conservation Reserve Program leases highly erodible cropland from farmers to remove the land from
production. The first land-based programs to hold farmers accountable for environmental abuse without
transferring the cost to society are the Conservation Compliance, Swampbuster, and Sodbuster

provisions of the Food Seciuity Act of 1985. These programs still do not assign the external costs of
production to the farmer, but they do provide the threat of removing existing subsidies if guidelines are
not met.

Despite the apparent political infeasibility of taxation as a policy tool for reducing agricultural
pollution, economists continue to advance the concept as both valid and efficient. Sharp and Bromley
noted "agricultural economists have adhered tenaciously to this methodology, to the extent of being

tendentious"(p.592). The predisposition of economists toward taxes is firmly based in economic theory.
Pigou proposed that external effects were a cause of suboptimal economic output levels. His solution

included the imposition of taxes or subsidies to equate prices with marginal social costs^ (Homer).
Coase argued that where nonattenuated property rights exist and where transactions costs are absent,

negotiations between involved parties will remove Pareto-relevant externalities and provide an efficient
^In the Pigouvian framework, marginal social costs are equal to marginal external costs plus marginal private costs.
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solution (Randall). In light of the acknowledged existence of significant transactions costs, most of the
literature since Coase's time has defended policies based upon Pigouvian taxes or subsidies. These

policies eliminate the need to consider the interference of transaction costs or ambiguous property rights
in natural resource issues (Homer).

Baumol showed that Pigouvian taxes or subsidies are necessary for optimal allocation of
resources and that neither compensation nor taxation should be applied to those affected by the
externality. A tax on soil loss was shown by Taylor, Frohberg, and Seitz to result in the most efficient
way of achieving a desired reduction in soil loss. Taylor and Frohberg found "the least costly method
of achieving a specified level of soil loss is a tax"(p. 33). Homer stated that a specific water quality goal
can be met at minimum cost through a system of charges against emitters.

In spite of such strong support for tax-based policies, policymakers have continued to use
emission standards to achieve environmental goals. Possible explanations for policymakers' preference
for emissions-based tools include a lack of understanding of altematives (White), the uncertainty of the

level of charges that would be required to meet the policy goals (Homer), and the political influence
of firms to direct a preferential policy (Buchanan and TuUock).

While the debate over the use of taxation as a policy instrument is important, it is not necessary
to determine the relative merits of either argument to accept the value of a tax-based model. The level
of taxation required to optimize both producer and policymaker goals in soil conservation is developed

in this study. That optimal tax level~or one derived from further application of the model-could
conceivably be used as the basis for a tax-based policy, yet the economic information derived from such

an analysis is valuable in its own right. The optimal tax level resulting from this model is an economic
measure of the level of extemality imposed upon society by agricultural production. This optimal tax,

if not imposed, may be thought of as an involuntary transfer from society as a whole to the agricultiural
industry.

Another consideration in the application of this model is that the model itself does not constrain
the optimd tax to be positive. The optimal transfer may not be a tax on farmers, but a subsidy to
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farmers. The model demonstrates the change in optimal tax as society places relative values on

agriculture versus the environment. It is entirely possible that as the relative value becomes strongly
skewed toward agriculture, the optimal tax will become negative—effectively a subsidy. In terms of this
model, it should be noted that the movement in recent years to lower agricultural subsidies and to place

the responsibility of certain environmental conditions on the farmer may be interpreted as such a shift
of priorities away &om agriculture and toward environmental quality. Therefore the use of taxation as
a policy instnunent is not constrained by a lack of political acceptance, but is a useful measure of
economic value whether or not the policy being modeled is ever considered for enaction.

The Dynamic Nature of Sedimentation

Sediment as a Dynamic Process

Ervin, et al. state "conservation programs...should be evaluated relative to some hypothetical

'optimal' erosion control solution which maximizes net social benefits"(p.274). Since the sedimentation
process is inherently dynamic in nature, such an "optimal solution" would necessarily be derived from
a model which explicitly recognizes soil as both stock and flow resource. Rausser (1980) states

"management of the soil resource is inherently dynamic and thus, static constructs modified by various

bells and whistles provide little insight" (p. 1094). The on-farm erosion problem and the off-farm
sedimentation problem can be thought of as dual specifications of the same process. The producer's
objective is maximization of revenues subject to soil loss constraints, while society's objective is
minimization ofsoil accumulation subject to revenue constraints. Thus,the imderlying dynamic structure

of the soil loss problem is invariant to the question of on-farm versus off-farm effects.

In referring to the on-farm problem, Rausser (1980) advances that soil conservation is a
problem in capital theory whose operational implementation is the management of soil resources over
time. He states "soil is not a single resource but a set of individual interrelated components which have

both stock and flow dimensions" (p. 1093). It is exactly this aspect of the soil loss process, the
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interrelationships of both stock and flow resources over time, that demands an explicitly dynamic
methodology such as optimal control theory. Swanson states "any discussion of the socially optimal rate
of soil conservation should include mention of the application of control theory" (p. 252).

The application of control theory to soil loss problems began in the 1970's and has increased
since that time. Analytical solutions to control theory models have been derived through a variety of

techniques such as approximately optimal decision rules (Burt and Cummings) and the Pontryagin
conditions^ of formal optimal control theory. In 1977, Burt and Cummings analyzed the steady state
associated with socially optimal natural resource use. In the same year, Frohberg and Swanson derived

the optimal levels of soil loss, considering offsite damages,discount rates, and various demand scenarios.
McConnell subsequently used optimal control theory to model the private and social utilization of soil.
Given the important role of optimal control theory in the analysis of soil loss problems and the
role this methodology plays in this analysis, a detailed description of the tool seems appropriate.

Optimal Control Theory in Economics

The foundations of optimal control theory reach back to the eighteenth century in the rather

arcane discipline of the calculus of variations. Limited in scope, the calculus of variations was all but
ignored by economists into the twentieth century. Capital theory, the study of the economics of time,
lacked the serious tools necessary to fulfill its potential as a valuable sub-discipline of economics

(Robinson, J.). While time was introduced into economic theory in the era of classical economics by
such economists as Bohm-Bawerk (Ekelund and H6bert; Schumpeter), the basis of analysis was still

primarily static in nature. In 1958, however, Russian mathematician L. S. Pontryagin introduced the

basic principles of optimal control theory (Pontryagin, et al.). This theory generalized the calculus of
variations, providing the tools necessary for economists to explore capital theory in ways which had not
previously been possible.

^See the section entitled 'Optimal Control Theory in Economics'in this chapter for a detailed derivation of the Pontryagin
conditions.
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Since that time, the use of optimal control theory in economics has expanded from the
traditional examination of economic capital to the examination of growth in many sub-disciplines of
economics. One such use to which these tools have been put is the examination of pollution abatement

questions and the economic evaluation of alternative possible actions where pollution is a problem.
Pollution is a unique application of the theory as the stock involved does not grow naturally, but decays;
and the "capital," the pollution stock, does not bring profits, but social and economic costs.

The Pontrya^ Conditions*
Consider the decision problem of a society or firm that wishes to minimize the damage costs
of some type of waterbome pollution. Assume this pollutant is contained within a lake and that the
damage from the pollutant is restricted to the lake.
At any date, t, a certain stock of pollution exists due to the past activities and decisions of the

firm.^ Denote the pollution stock as p(f). Given this pollution stock p at time t, the fum must make
decisions concerning the rate of pollution inflow, rate of pollution removal, etc. For the purposes of this
exposition, we will consider the rate of pollution inflow to be fixed-that is, beyond the control of the

firm~and will assiune the firm can control only the rate of pollutant removal at a given time, denoted
by rit).

From the inherited pollution stock at a given date and the current removal decisions, the firm
incurs a certain cost per unit of time. Denote this cost function as c\p(t),r(t),t]^, where c determines
the rate at which costs are being incurred at time t as a result of pollution level p and decision r.

* The mathematical derivation in this section is adapted to the pollution problem from the capital theory derivation of
Dorfman.

^ It is assumed that control over the pollutant is held exclusively by some decision-making body of a Arm or society. For the
purposes of exposition, the decision-making organization is referred to as the 'Arm.'

* For ease of reading and typing, the time subscripts will be omitted except where necessary for clarity of presentation.
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Thus, when f=0, the total costs incurred between the initial date

and some terminal date

T, can be expressed by:

(2.1)

CCPo.f)»j"c{p,r,t)dt

which is simply the sum of the rate at which costs are being incurred at every instant, discounted to the

initial date, and added up for all instants. Note that the argument c(j) accounts for the needed
discounting. The variable f denotes the entire time path of the decision variable r from tg to T. This

indicates that if the firm begins with initial pollution level Pg, then follows the removal policy f, the
resulting cost, C, is the integral of the costs incurred at each instant; these results in turn being
dependent upon the time being considered, and the pollution stock and removal rate applicable at that
time. The firm may choose the removal rate but cannot independently determine the pollution stock
at each time. That stock is determined by the pollution stock at the initial time and the time path
chosen for r. Thus,the rate of change of the pollution stock is determined by its present level, the time
under consideration, and the removal rate. That is:

(2.2)

dt

The removal rate, then, at any given time, has two effects. It influences the rate at which costs are
incurred at that time and it influences the rate at which the pollution stock changes, and thus, the level

of pollution which will prevail in subsequent periods.
This is the essence of the dynamic decision-making process: to choose a time path (in this case

f)so as to optimize the integral of the stock variable (in this case to minimize the total pollution cost,
C) taking into account the effect of the control variable on both the ciurent costs and on the level of
pollution in the future. The problem here, of course, is that the entire time path must be chosen, where
standard calculus teaches us only how to derive a single optimal value of a variable. The solution is to
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transform this problem, which requires us to determine an entire time path, into one which requires us

only to determine a single number. This solution is the maximum principle of optimal control theory,
developed by L. S. Pontryagin and first presented by him in 1958.

Although the calculus of variations—which is a less generalized form of optimsd control theorydates back to the eighteenth centiuy, its usefulness was severely limited by the requirement that the
control variable must be the time rate of change of the state variable. This was only useful when the

system being modeled was linear in the control variable, an uncommon occurrence m the real world.
Pontryagin's contribution was to generalize the calculus of variations into a form in which more realistic
non-linear models could be manipulated. Though written in general form, it is clear that the pollution
problem would probably be non-linear in the control. It is intuitively reasonable to assume that the
marginal removal cost of pollution will increase as the pollution level decreases. To remove one "imit"
of pollutant at high pollution levels should be relatively easy compared with removing the same "unit"
when pollution levels are low and the pollutant is scarce.

To derive Pontryagin's maximum principle, we first generalize the previous cost equation:

(23)

T

C(p,Xt)'fc(p,r,t)dt.
t

Now consider two time intervals, a short time interval of length A beginning at time t and a longer

interval from time t + A to time T. The short interval. A, may be thought of as being so short that the
firm would not or could not change the removal rate. We can then split equation (23) into two
intervals as follows:

(2.4)

r

C(p,P,r)=c(p,,x,,f)A+ j" c[p(t+^),r,i\dt.

This formula demonstrates that, given pollution stock p at time t, if the time path of removal is followed,
the costs incurred to time T consist of two parts. The first is the rate at which costs are accrued during
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the interval times the length of the interval. The second is an integral in the same form as(23), except
that it starts at time t + A. Thus, we can rewrite (2.4) as:

(23)

C(p,,f,/)=c(p,r,,OA +C(/>,^^,f,t+A).

If the firm knew the best choice of f from date t on, it could just follow that policy and obtain

the optimal value of C, denoted V where:
(2.6)

V

=»min

.

V does not explicitly include the f argument as that argument has been optimized out. The minimum

cost which can be obtained given />, and t does not depend upon F but is the value which can be
obtained from the best possible choice of f.

Now assume that policy r, is followed from t to t+ A, and that f is followed thereafter. The
cost associated with such a circumstance would be:

(2.7)

K(p,.r,.r)=c(p,.r,./)A + K*(p,,^.r+A).

That is, the costs accrued following such a policy are the costs from the initial period A under decision
plus the minimum possible costs given time r-*-A and pollution />(r-*-A)resulting from the initial
period. The equation has now been reduced to the ordinary problem of finding the optimal value of

r,. Once the optimal r, is found and entered into the equation, V will be V.
To find the optimal value of r,, we take the partial derivative of(2.7) with respect to r, and set
it equal to zero. We are assuming that this derivative does indeed give us a minimum rather than a
maximum or an inflection point.

: (2.8)

.g:=.A±c(p.r„r)+-Ar[p,,^,t^A]=0.
dr,
dr,
dr,
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Although r, is not explicit in the function V,it is implicit in the term

. Thus the 3/9r, V" term may

be rewritten as:

no.

8r_ dV

^ ^

dpjt^A)

dr, dpit*A) dr,

The first factor on the right hand side of equation (2.9) is the rate at which the minimized costs from
time r + A change with respect to the pollution level existing at time t + A. It may be considered to be
the marginal damage, cost of pollution at time t A,or the amount by which a unit increase in pollution
level at time t + A would increase the minimum possible cost of pollution over time. Were pollution
a "good" rather than a "bad" this would represent the marginal value of the capital stock, so it is
0

represented at time t as A.(/)» — V*

In the second factor, ;»(t+A) can be rewritten as p(t)+^A.

dp

That is, the pollution level at time t + A is equal to the pollution level at time t plus the rate of change
in pollution times the interval. From equation (2.2),

we know that p depends upon r,.

Thus, we can write —p(r+A)= A—. Substituting these two equations into (2.8), we get:
r,
8r,

(2.10)

^ a \
PC

3r.

•X(t+A)Af-^

We can approximate the term A,(r+A) as A(0 + A,(t)A. That is, the marginal damage at t + A is the
marginal damage at t plus the rate of change of X times the interval over which it changes. Substituting

this expression into equation (2.10), we get:

(2.11)

-g-+l(0-^
+i(0A-^=O.
dr,
dr,
dr.
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Now take the limit of equation (2.11) as A-0. The third term approaches zero and the
following equation results:
(2.12)

dr,

dr,

This is the first of the Pontryagin conditions and is well interpreted by Dorfman.
It makes perfectly good sense to an economist... .that along the optimal path of the
decision variable at any time, the marginal short-run effect of a change in decision
must just coimter-balance the effect of that decision on the total value of the capital
stock an instant later. We see that because the second term in the equation is the

marginal effect of the ciurent decision on the rate of growth of capital with capital
valued at its marginal worth, A.. The firm should choose [the control variable] at every
moment so that the marginal immediate gain just equals the marginal long-nm cost
....(p. 821).

Although Dorfman was speaking about capital in the more traditional sense, the analogy to our pollution
problem is straightforward. In this case, the firm should choose a removal rate at every moment so that
the discounted immediate msirginal cost of removal is just equal to the discounted long-run marginal
cost of leaving the pollution in the lake.

Now assume that the optimal r, which satisfies equation (2.12) is obtained and that the firm
initially establishes this as the removal rate. In this case,

(2.13)

V(p,t)

becomes

and:

^ r[p(t+A).f+A].

Differentiating this equation with respect to p, and remembering that the left hand side—by definitionequals A(r), results in:

A(r)

=A-^
+^r[p(f+A).f+A]
dp dp
dp

dp

■A —+fl+A^l(A.
+ XA)
dp \
dp)
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dp

We can ignore the term in
(2.14)

dp

dp

and make cancellations to obtain:^
=

Op

op

This is the second Pontryagin condition and~in a general sense-is the rate of change in the
marginal value of capital. In a specific sense, it is the rate of depreciation of capital (depreciation vs.

appreciation due to the negative sign of the - JL term). In our pollution example, this condition may
be interpreted as the decrease in damage costs which would occur if a "unit" of pollution were postponed
from entering the lake.

The Hamiltonian

Equations (2.12),(2.14), and (2.2) can be combined to create the Hamiltonian functional^:
(2.15)

/f=c(p,r.r)+ X(r)/(p,r,0.

This functional is the constrained dynamic optimization equation, analogous to the Lagrangian in static
analysis. The Hamiltonian shows the total contribution to costs which occurs at an instant in time,

taking into account all of the interrelationships we have discussed. Thus HL would be the total
contribution to costs of all activities undertaken during period A. To minimize this cost, we take the
partial derivatives of the Hamiltonian with respect to r,p, and A., and set them equal to zero. In doing
so, we are saying that we will, at every instant in time, choose that rate of removal which will minimize
costs. If costs are minimized at every instant of time, totsil costs must also be at a minimum. Finally,

♦

Since A is minute, A» must be even smaller and may be considered to be insignificant. This linearization is documented
in Pontryagin, et al.

^The Hamiltonian is defined as a functional as the terms of the expression are functions rather than variables.
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the derivatives of the Hamiltonian are equated to the previous results to create the formal Pontryagin
conditions of optimal control. They are:

(Z17)

(2.18)

dp

dp

dp

^=P=f(P.r.t).
OA

Note the reciprocal nature of the pollution level and the marginal cost of pollution in the
equations. The partial derivative of H with respect to either is the time derivative of the other.
Together, these three equations determine the time paths of p(t), rit), and k(t). Condition (2.16), the
maximum principle, indicates that the removal rate at every point in time should be chosen so that the

marginal immediate costs just balance the value of the discounted marginal addition to the acciunulated
damage costs. That is to say, when the cost of removal equals the damage cost of the pollutant, the
removal rate will be at an optimum. Condition (2.17), the adjoint equation, indicates that the pollution
damage increases at the same rate that it adds to total costs. Condition (2.18), the equation of motion,
shows how the pollution level changes as a result of its current level and the decisions made. These

three equations may be manipulated, by substitution, into two equations in the form of time derivatives.
Given boxmdary conditions, the two-equation system can be solved for the decision variable at a given
time. This process may be repeated to obtain the optimal values of the decision variable through the
entire time path.

The boimdary conditions may either be initial conditions, which describe the pollution level at
time t^O, or terminal conditions, which describe the target pollution level at f=r. For example, we

may know the current level of pollution in oin lake and we may set a target that at finite time 7, the
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pollution level should equal zero. We could then trace the entire time path of the removal rate
necessary to achieve the terminal condition given the initial condition.
While this derivation defines only a single actor with a single goal and control variable, the

optimal control methodology may be generalized to multiple states, controls, and goals. The model
developed in this study includes a single state variable, two control variables and four goals with two
actors. The concept of multiple goals is discussed in the last section of this chapter.

Multiple Policymaker Goals

With one exception, each of the models reviewed in this chapter has assumed a single objective
on the part of each actor represented. Van Kooten, et al., however, developed a model specifically to
examine the trade-off between net retimis and soil quality for farmers in southwestern Saskatchewan.

These competing goals must be biilanced by the farmer according to some personal preference function.

Various weights were assigned to each objective and a trade-off function was derived to examine the
relationship between the goals.

Even more than the producer, a policymaker must balance many competing goals in policy

implementation. The policymaker is influenced in specific implementation decisions by political
pressures, social welfare, and his own preference function. Reichelderfer and Boggess state that the
correct specification of program decision makers' objectives is critical. Rausser (1981) attempted to

achieve this by specifying a weighted political preference function. The model incorporated a weighting
scheme to represent the relative importance of the various objectives of an agricultural policymaker.

In a similar manner, Sylvia and Anderson applied weights to various policy goals in a dynamic model
of net-pen aquaculture. The relative values of the weights were then allowed to vary, providing a set
of policy frontiers over time.

These three elements of a soil erosion policy model~the interaction of the producer and

policymaker, the dynamic representation of the sedimentation process, and the explicit specification of
multiple policy goals—are incorporated into the model described in detail in Chapter III.
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CHAPTER III

THE THEORETICAL MODEL

THE PRODUCER'S DYNAMIC MODEL

The farmer produces crops and erosion as he seeks to maximize the time stream of discoimted
profits. The use of profit maximization as the objective of producers is well established in economic
theory (Henderson and Quandt; Van Kooten, et al.). The erosion results from tillage of the soil for
planting and from harvesting. Erosion production is measured as some multiple of production and the
stock of eroded soil (hereafter referred to as erosion stock) is eliminated through runoff into streams
and ditches carried by rain. The erosion affects the productivity of the farm production and negatively
impacts waterways downstream in the form of sediment. While potential instruments for controlling
erosion by the farmer might include controls such as tillage practices, site placement, Held size and field
slope, it is assumed that such factors are fbced and that the only existing instrument is production.
Variations in the other factors are assumed to be accounted for in the cost equation. The only

instrument available to the policymaker to affect the farmer's decisions is a per unit "tax" on erosion.
The "producer" in this model is assumed to be a homogeneous aggregation of all individual producers
within the producing area.
The producer's formal problem is:

(3.1)

r~

Maximize j"e'''\pY(f)-C(y(f))-xE(t)'\dt
r>o

(32)

subject to: E=F(£(t),y(t)),
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and the usual set of non-negativity and convexity conditions, where:

is the revenue per unit of

production, Y is the number of units produced, C is a convex production cost function, t is a per unit
erosion tax,£ is the erosion stock, t is time, r is the private instantaneous annual rate of discoimt, and
F represents the erosion state equation.

Using an optimal control framework, the current-value Hamiltonian is:
(33)

H"
'
lpY(t)-C(y(r))-xE(t)]+ mEit),Yit)).
The necessary conditions are:

(3.4)

— »(p-C(y))+ ^F'iY)=0

(optimality condition)

(33)

- — » A,-rk =• T -kF(,E)

(adjoint equation)

(3.6)

—-F(,E,Y)*E

e^M

(equation of motion).

dY

BE

dk

The optimality condition indicates that the short-run profits must just equal the incremental
erosion costs to the farmer. The adjoint equation relates the change in the marginal cost of erosion to

the tax rate, the private rate of discount, and the erosion stock. The equation of motion indicates that
the physical/economic optimum must equate the production and natural decay of erosion. It is
implicitly assumed that the transversality and complementary slackness conditions hold as follows:
X(7)iO and X(7)£(7)=0.

The Pontryagin conditions can be manipulated into a dynamic plane equation system of two
Hrst-order differential equations in Y and E.

Rearrangmg (3.4) to isolate k yields
(3.7)

^ ^

F(X)
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then taking the derivative of (3.7) with respect to time yields

(3.8)

i- n(C"(y))(F(i0)-'-(C(y)-p)(F'(JO)-^(F"(D)].
Rearranging (3.5) to isolate X, yields

(3.9)

X'X(r-FiE))*t,

then equation (3.7) is substituted into (3.9), resulting in a function of Y and E only:

(3.10)

i=-^to(r-F(£))+T.
The first and second conditions are combined, and all A, terms are eliminated by equating (3.8)

and (3.10), giving
(3.11)

C'(Y) (C\Y)-p)(F'(Y))

F(Y)

(F(y))2

=-^^^^(r-F(£))+x.
F(Y)

Rearranging (3.11) yields the differential expression for the optimal change in output:

,312^

Y'(.C'(y)-P)(r-F(E))(F(Y))^x(F(.Y))^
(C"iY))iF(Y))-iCiY)-p)iF'm)

The state equation, showing the change in the erosion stock over time, may be represented by
the explicit equation:

(3.13)

FiE(t),Yit))'E'-mt)+kT(t), subject to 0<Kk< 1,

where h is the coefficient of decay of the erosion stock and k is the erosion production coefficient.

Thus, the net change in erosion stock in a given period of time is the erosion generated from production
less the eroded soil carried out of the study area by the action of wind or water.
The producer's cost function is assiuned to take the form:

(3.14)

C(X{.t))'q+dY(f)-^gY^{f), subject to
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d,g>Q.

This form is consistent with microeconomic theory and previous empirical analysis (Ervin, et aL;
Henderson and Quandt; Sylvia and Anderson).

Substituting equations (3.13) and (3.14) into (3.1) and solving the partial derivatives for the
explicit form of(3.12) yields:
(3.15)

r= Y{r+A)+

2g

Equations (3.13) and (3.15) constitute our system of first-order differential equations. To
evaluate the motion of this system, we must first identify those locations in which the system is stable,
that is, the steady states associated with these equations. At equilibrium, the change in Y over time, Y,
becomes zero. Thus, setting equation (3.15) equal to zero and solving for Y will result in the
equilibrium level of output, Y*:
(3.16)

2g

2gir*h)

The equation of motion (3.6) will also be zero at steady state. By substituting (3.16) into (3.6)
and setting it equal to zero, the equilibrium erosion stock, E*, may be found:

(317)

^ '

h

2gh

—

lgh{r*h)'

Each isocline in Figure 3.1 shows the schedule of points on which its respective variable will not
change, and the intersection of those lines—at Y*, £* —shows the only equilibrium point which exists in
this system. At Y*, E*, neither the acreage in production nor the erosion rate would change. Since

it is presumed that the system is not at equilibrium, we are particularly interested in the stability of the
equilibrium and the motion which takes place elsewhere in the plane. We can determine that motion,

and the nature of the steady state, with equations(3.13) and (3.15). We take the derivative of each with

35

respect to Y,' and determine the sign of the
E-O

result:

(3.18)

>0.

dY

Y-0

(3.19)

>0.

BY

and plot the motion which occurs around the
steady state.
Hgure 3.2 shows the effect of a

Figure 3.1. Phase diagram demonstrating soiution isoclines in
Y, E space.

movement off of the isoclines. From (3.18) we know that any movement off of Y=0 will result in
further

movement

in

the

same

direction.

Therefore, the equilibrium is unstable with
E-O

respect to Y. Equation (3.19) shows that any
positive (upward) movement of Yfrom E=0 will

result in a positive (rightward) movement in E.

Y-0

If we think of the two isoclines as dividing the

plane into four quadrants as shown in Figure 3.2,
the trajectories within each quadrant will move

as in Figure 33. The movement clearly defines
a saddle-point equilibrium. Although there are

Figure 3.2.
quadrant.

Phase diagram demonstrating movement by

an infinite munber of trajectories that satisfy the
differential equation system, there is only one line which converges directly to the equilibrium and only

'Normally, the derivative of each would be taken with respect to the other as that usually gives a more tractable result.
This system is unusual, however, in that Y is not a function E. The necessary information is still obtained by taking the

derivative of Y with respect to Y, although the result is somewhat more difficult to interpret.
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one line which diverges directly from the
E-0

equilibriiun. These lines, the convergent and

divergent separatrices respectively, will not be
crossed by any trajectory and therefore provide
a boimdary of movement for all of the
trajectories.

All trajectories other than the

separatrices will miss the steady state point and
p

will either pass into another quadrant or out of
the relevant range of the diagram.

The

k .jt

Figure 3J. Phase diagram demonstrating global movement of
trajectories.

trajectory that crosses a quadrant boimdary takes
on the attributes of the new quadrant.

In order to meet the transversality conditions, where

the producer must approach the

equilibrium at Y*, E' as t-"». Since point A is a saddle-point, the only approach path is along the
convergent separatrix where T=0. The producer's profit maximizmg strategy is to adjust output to Y*.
Erosion stock will then either increase or decrease toward equilibrium at E', depending upon whether
the initial condition of£ is to the right or to the left of £=0.

THE POLICYMAKER'S DYNAMIC MODEL

Once the optimal producer's behavior is determined, the policymaker's dynamic problem may
be solved. Assume that the policymaker wishes to maximize the stream of discounted net revenue from

agricultural production, water quality, and taxes on erosion. The producer may use the producer
response information derived from the producer's model to determine the optimal tax policy. The
policymaker's formal problem is:
r—

(3.20)

Maximize J e [apY(t)-byE(t)+cr(f)£(0]dt
H)
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(3.21)

subject to:

(3.22)

E=F(,Eit),Y(t))
y=G(r(t).T(t))
a+6+c»l; 0^a,b<l; 0<cil;

and the usual set of non-negativity and convexity conditions where:
a, b, c = the relative weights the policymaker attaches to agricultural revenue, water
quality, and tax revenue, respectively;

G = the state equation for Y resulting from the producer's movement along the
optimal path;
Y = the unit cost of the erosion stock,E ; and
6 = the social instantaneous annual rate of discount.

The pY(]t) term is the increase in the value of the objective functional due to agricultural

production, - y E(t) is the decrease in the value ofthe objective functional due to erosion damages,and T(r)E(r)
is the increase in the value of the objective functional due to tax revenues.

The current value Hamiltonian for the problem b:

(323)

H"'apY{i)-byE(f)+CT(/)£(r)+|i[W),T(0)l

The condition expressed in equation (3.22) does not appear in the Hamiltonian. In the

producer model, the producer's optimal path was to move production to Y* and continue to perpetually
produce at that level. Thus Y=0.

Substituting (3.13) into (3.23) yields the explicit Hamiltonian:
(3.24)

H='apY-byE*cxE*\i[-hE*kY].

Since the producer's optimal production b at T*, given some tax rate, Y* from (3.16) b
substituted for Y in (3.24):
(3.25)

H=ap

p-d
2g

zk
■byE^<rcE*-\i
2g(r+A)
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xk

( 2g

A))

2g(r+;

The necessary conditions are:

(326)

jg,-

^ '

at

(3.27)

2^r+A) .

oK

(3.28)

M=Js:3-A£+jtf£-g—1*_
a|i

. 2g

2gir+h)

Rearranging (3.26) yields:

(3.29)

2gir*h)

=cE 2gir*h)
^2^.

An examination of the Hamiltonian demonstrates that the system is linear in the control. Thus,

by Miller, the solution is of the "bang-bang" type and the following tax rates derived from (3.29) would
prove optimal:
>
If

2g(r*h)

2gir*h)

-cE
'

2gir*h)

<

2gir^h)

then t"^
then

t*

then

t""

The interpretation of this solution is straightforward.

—

2g(r*h)

is the amotmt by which

agricultural revenues are decreased in the current period, cE is the amoimt by which tax revenues are

increased in the current period, and —— is the amount by which the discounted stream of future
2g(r+A)
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erosion damage decreases, all when the tax rate is increased by one unit.
—

2g(r+A)

cE > —

Thus, when

,the value of agricultural production and tax revenue is more valuable to the

2g(r+A)'

policymaker than the cost of erosion damage resulting from production. Given this, the policymaker
wants to increase production to Y* and he implements tax rate t"". When —
cE < ——,
2g(r+h)
2g(r+h)

the policymaker values clean water more highly than current production and he implements tax rate
to decrease agricultural erosion.
The Pontryagin conditions can be manipulated to yield the optimal tax rate, t*. From (3.29),
isolate p:

(330)

|i = 2i:g£(r>/.)-npk

Then take the time derivative of [x in (330):
(331)

er

I?

Similarly, equation (3.27) can be arranged to isolate |i:
(332)

|i » by ~

)•

Eliminating |1 by setting (331) and (3.32) equal yields:

(3.33)

2^(L!^£=feY-eT + p(h+«).
ifc^

All elements ofthe necessary conditions are now included in the equation as E from (3.28)and|i
from (3.30) are substituted into (3.33):
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Icgjr^h)

(334)

'p-d

-hE+k

xk ^

Irf-cx +(A+i)

, ig '2g(r*h)[

2cgE(r+h)-apk

All X terms are isolated on the left side of the equation:

f335) ex

2gir*h)

^^'2£gh(r*h)^, 2cg(h+6Xr+h)^ 2cgk(r^-h)(p-d) .. apk(h-*-&)
jb2

p

2g]^

'

Equation (335), when simplified, results in the equality:
(336)

0=

2cgh(r+h)*2cg(h-*-i)(r*h) ^

c(r*h)(p-d) .

apihxj,)

k

k

'

Although there is no longer an explicit x term, t is implicit in the optimal level of E. To isolate the

implicit T, the E term is moved to the left hand side, and the entire equation is multiplied by
(337)

£[2cgA(r+A)+2cg(A+5)(r+A)] »cA(r+A)(p-d)+np/fc(A+5)-

To obtain the optimal tax rate, t*, the optimal erosion stock, £*, from the producer model
(3.17) is substituted into (337):
(338)

Hp-d)

xiP-

2gh

2gh(r*h)

[2cgA(r+A)+2cg(A+8)(r+A)]=ck(f+h)(p-d)+<jpA(A+5)-bykP,

and the equation is rearranged to isolate t*:
(339)

(3.40)

-^[c(2A+fi)]=1 *<^[c(r+A)(2A+5)]-ck(r+h)(p-d)-apk{h*b)*bylP,
h

h

AA0?-rf)[c(r-t-A)(2A-fa)] chk(r^h)(p-d) aphkjh^b) ^
h]P[c(2h*6)]

]p[c(2h->-6)]

and simplified:

41

byhJp

]p[c(2h+6)] lP[c(2h*6)]'

f3 41')

^,_(h*!>)(p-d)(jr*h) cq>hih*b) ^ bfh
K2h*b)

kci2h*b) tf(2A+6)"

The optimal tax rate equation can be thought of as a tax response function of the policymaker's,

or society's, values of agricultural production versus water quality. A greater value placed on agricultural
revenues(a) by the policymaker results in a lower the equilibrium tax rate. Conversely, a greater value
placed on water quality(b)results in a higher equilibrium tax rate. The relationship between the value

for tax revenues (c) and the tax rate, however, depends upon the elasticity of the tax revenue supply
curve which is determined by the relative values of h and k (Sylvia and Anderson).
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CHAPTER IV

THE EMPIRICAL MODEL

A theoretical model may be useful in describing an economic process, but validation of the
model through empirical application allows the researcher to analyze the ability of the model to
accurately reflect events in the real world. An econometric model readily lends itself to statistical
hypothesis testing, yet a mathematical model requires other means of validation. In such a case,
judgement on the validity of a model may be based upon the weight of evidence, through application,

rather than through statistical inference (Tweeten). The empirical application of the model developed
in Chapter III will allow both for non-statistical validation of the model and for development of further
insights into the relationships being modeled.

STUDY AREA

To this pomt, no mention has been made of a geographical site for the model. This is because

the model itself is not site speciHc. The expectation is that the model would be applied to specific crops
in hydrologically homogeneous regions at the watershed level. In this way, the optimal tax level would
vary according the specific characteristics of a region and the crops grown therein. This also allows the

flexibility to assign differing levels of priority to agricultural production versus environmental quality
based upon specific socio-economic criteria. Agriculture may well be given higher priority in prime
agricultural areas while surface water quality may be more highly weighted in areas that are
environmentally sensitive.

There are several characteristics which must be possessed by the study area. First, the area
must support significant agricultural production. Second, the area must be subject to signiHcant
agricultural erosion. Finally, there must be sufficient information available on the area to develop the
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data required by the model. Such information includes land use, agricultural production practices,
agricultural production costs, soil characteristics, hydrology, and offsite erosion damage costs. Several
sites in Tennessee meet the first two criteria, but the third requirement is more difficult to
accommodate.

From those watersheds that meet the first two criteria, a three-county region in northwestern

Tennessee is selected. The selected study £u-ea includes Obion, Weakley and Gibson Counties
(Figure 4.1). The study area meets the first criterion in that it is predominantly agricultural, with a
majority of its land area being engaged in agriculture. The second criterion is also met. West
Tennessee has the highest average erosion rate in the nation (Moore and Klaine). Finally, a study on
groundwater contamination was recently completed in the area which provides much of the information
needed for the application of this model (Cole). Thus, all three criteria are fully met in this area.

Figure 4.1. Map of Tennessee, showing the study area.

Description of Study Area

The three selected counties are located in the area categorized by the Soil Conservation Service
as the Southern Mississippi Valley Silty Uplands, or Major Land Resource Area 134 (USDA/SCS,
1981). The region is also referred to as the Southern Plateau Slope(Mundy and Gray). With elevations

ranging from 25 to 100 meters(USDA/SCS,1981), this region lies between the Mississippi bottomlands
and the Cumberland Plateau.
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The majority of the land in the area is used for agriculture, with com,soybeans and wheat being
the primary crops. Given their predominance in the region, each of these commodities is modeled
separately in this analysis. Agricultural practices and production enterprises are consistent throughout

the three counties(Mimdy and Gray), as are the hydrological characteristics(Water Resources Council).
Precipitation is abimdant in the area.
averaging about SO inches per year, and

Table 4.1. Acreage distribution by soil type.

yields of major crops are above state

Soil Type

averages (Mundy and Gray).

Adler

8,881

1.9

Birds

5,609

1.2

Calloway

38327

8.2

Collins

59360

12.7

3,739

0.8

There are 12 primary soil types in
the watershed. The soils are mainly from

deep or moderately deep loess with Loring,

Convent

Acreage

Percentage

Falaya and Collins accounting for more than

Falaya

79,991

16.9

50% of the total cropland area. The soil

Grenada

73,382

15.7

Lexington

7,011

13

108,903

233

Memphis

28311

6.1

the population being classified as urban.

Providence

18,229

3.9

The largest incorporated city in the area has

Waverly

36,457

7.8

467,400

100.0

types of the region are listed in Table 4.1.

Loring
The area is largely rural, with only 42% of

a population of less than 11,000. Selected

demographics of the area are presented in

Total
Source: Cole, 1991

Figure 4.2.

Data Needs

Data required for a numerical solution to the model include several economic and physical
coefficients, most of which are not readily available for a given watershed. Because many of these
coefHcients are crop-specific, the model is best applied to each crop individually. Ultimately, the
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OBION COUNTY

Area (square miles):
Population per Square Mile:
Population

550
60

13,171
19,610

Urban:
Rural:

(40.2%)
(59.8%)

Population of Incorporated Cities
2375
10,436

South Fulton:

Union City:

WEAKLEY COUNTY

Area (square miles):
Population per Square Mile:
Population

581
57

14,394
23,766

Urban:
Rural:

(395%)
(605%)

Population of Incorporated Cities
5,405
8,989

McKenzie:
Martin:
GIBSON COUNTY

Area (square miles):
Population per Square Mile:
Population

602
82

22,893
26,574

Urban:

Rural:

Population of Incorporated Cities
10,290
8,083
4,601

Humboldt:

Milan:
Trenton:

Source: Tennessee Statistical Abstracts, 1989

Figure 42. Demographics of the study area.
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(46.3%)
(53.7%)

analytical model is reduced to two key equations which represent the decisions made by the producer
and the policymaker. The final policymaker decision is reflected in equation 3.41 from Chapter Hf:

13411
^''

jt(2A+a)

aphjh^b) , byh
kci2h*&) c(2A+«)'

where r' is the optimal tax rate; and d and g are the linear and quadratic terms of the cost equation:

(3.14) C(T(r))=»^+dT(0+gI^(r), subject to 9^0; d,g>0.
Variables h and k are the sediment decay and growth coefficients, respectively, of the equation of
motion:

(3.13)

FiEit),Y(f))=E'-hEit)*kYit), subject to 0<A,k<l.

Variables r and S are the private and social discount rates, respectively, p is the unit price of the
commodity, / is the unit cost to society of offsite sediment damage; and a, b and c are the relative

weights society places on agriculture, the environment, and tax revenues respectively.
The final producer decision is defined as:
(3.16)

2g

2g(r*hy

where Y" is the optimal level of production; r is the applicable tax rate; and d, g, h, k, r and p are as
defined above.

Economic Coefficients

The economic data required include the cost equation, the commodity price, the unit cost of
offsite sediment damages and the private and social discount rates. A review of literatme reveals no

previous studies in which agricultural production cost equations are derived for the study area. Thus,
it is necessary to estimate cost equations from available data. A combined linear programming/linear
regression model is developed to estimate these equations. The development of this model is described
in detail in the Data Modeling section of this chapter.
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The proxy used in this study for the real social instantaneous annual rate of discount is the
nominal rate on AAA corporate bonds for June 1987 less the percentage change in price from Jime

1986-1987 (Federal Reserve Board). This rate, S = 0.05, is assumed to be a good average of the
productivity of low-risk investments in the capital markets. The assumed private instantaneous annual
rate of discount is based upon the annual long-term fixed deposit rates offered by commercial banks in
the area. The private discount rate of r = 0.10 is the median of rates quoted by several banks operating
in Memphis, Tennessee.
The unit cost of offsite sediment damages is drawn from Alexander and English which identifies
offsite sediment damage costs for watersheds across the United States. In this paper, the authors used
an interregional sedimentation model to estimate the impact of the Conservation Reserve Program on

sedimentation and on the offsite costs of sediment damage. The authors combined the offsite erosion
damage costs reported by Clark, et al. and the erosion levels reported in the 1982 National Resources

Inventory(NRI) to provide a base from which cost per ton estimates are generated. Erosion data are
taken from the NRI, aggregated to a producing area level, and multiplied by appropriate sediment
delivery ratios. The resulting estimates of suspended and deposited sediment are aggregated into
regional estimates, and the total sediment costs are divided by this result. The unit cost of offsite
sediment damages for this area is $6.38 per ton.

The price of each commodity is obtained from Tennessee Agriculture, 1990 (Tennessee
Department of Agriculture), reflecting 1988 values. The 1988 values are used to maintain consistency
with the cost figures. Other methods of setting prices are possible, such as attempting to forecast an

average future price, but such methods have frequently been shown to be no better than naive forecasts
(Pindyck and Rubenfeld). In this model, since price is held constant, consistency with costs is chosen

as the more important attribute of the price levels with the understanding that this introduces the
implicit assumption that producers expect these price levels perpetually. The prices used are: $2.75 per
bushel for com, $7.65 per bushel for soybeans, and $3.40 per bushel for wheat.
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Physical Coeflicients

The physical data required are the coefficients of the equation of motion: the sediment growth

coefficient and the sediment decay coefficient. The sediment growth coefOcient is developed using the
Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC), a plant growth/erosion simulator. The development
of this model is described in detail in the Data Modeling section of this chapter.
The sediment decay coefficient is much more difEcuIt to estimate than the sediment growth
coefficient. A literature search revealed no information on studies in which sediment movement as

defined in this model have been measured. Discussions with Dr. Don Myer" served largely to confirm
the difficulty in estimating such a figure. Some generalizations can be made, however. One is that
sediment decay as described in this model can be expected to be extremely slow. Further, the level of

sediment decay will be very minor as compared with new sediment contained in both agricultural and
non-agricultural runoff. While this decay could vary between 0 and 25 percent annually, depending upon
the specific hydrology of an area, most values will fall in the lower extreme of the range. An estimate

of .01 is selected for this coefficient. This estimate, while somewhat arbitrary, is consistent with the
available knowledge at this time.

DATA MODELING

The Cost Equation

The development of a cost equation for this watershed presents the modeler with the same task

facing producers, which is determining an efficient idlocation of limited resource inputs among
competing alternatives. In both cases, the intent is to minimize the cost associated with production of

'"Personal communication with Dr. Don Myer, USDA National Sedimentation Laboratory, Oxford Mississippi, 1991.
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a given level of output." The modeling task is complicated further in that the cost equation must
account for all of the resources of the region and it must reflect the change in costs as output changes.

Linear programming is a mathematical method commonly used to analyze the problem of
efficiently allocating limited resources among competing agricultural production enterprises (Hillier and
Lieberman). The linear programming algorithm may be used to determine the minimum cost required
to produce a given output subject to the constraints imposed by the physical processes. Such a costminimizing model is used in this study to generate individuzd points on a cost curve. Each of the 12 soil
types is associated with a cost of production and a yield potential. The model selects those combinations
which meet the exogenously specified revenue constraint at the least cost. Once the basic model is
developed, it is run multiple times using an increasing revenue requirement in each run. Revenue is
chosen, rather than yield, to standardize the model across different crops. For each crop, the model is
run with revenue constrained to a minimum of five million dollars, with subsequent constraints

increasing at five million dollar increments until an infeasible solution is obtained. The resulting
minimiim cost levels are then associated with the corresponding levels of output, through linear

regression, to obtain continuous equations representing the relationship between cost and output.
The linear programming model may be mathematically expressed as:
(4.1)

MIN

Z = CX
IX iL

S.L

DX i R

X^O; forallx

where: Z is the scalar objective function value, total cost;
is a 12 X 1 vector of production activities by soil type;
C is a 1 X 12 vector of activity costs;
/is a 12 X 12 identity matrix;

"a producer's goal is generally expressed as profit maximization which is the dual formulation of cost minimization. On

optimization, the results of each are equivalent, so the producer's behavior may be expressed in either form (Henderson and
Quandt).
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L is a 12 X 1 vector of land resources available by soil type;

i) is a 1 X 12 vector of receipts per acre by activity; and
is a scalar representing total revenue.

The model is run for each major commodity in the area—com, soybeans and wheat—assuming
homogeneous production of the commodity being modeled in each run. These three commodities
represent over 70 percent of the agricultural production of the area (Mundy and Gray).
One problem involved in modeling an entire watershed is the variation in tillage practices.
Practices vary from one farmer to another and over time. To account for this while still maintaining

a parsimonious model,each commodity model is rim under two different tillage conditions: conventional
tillage and conservation tillage. This creates a bound on the results and allows for an analysis of the
sensitivity of the results to tillage practices.

Six models result from the system explained above and are referred to in this study as the
primary model configurations. Specifically, the primary model configurations are: conventional tillage
com;conservation tillage com;conventional tillage soybeans;conservation tillage soybeans;conventional
tillage wheat; and conservation tillage wheat. The linear programming model input files for each of the
primary model configurations, written in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) language,
are shown in Appendix A. The models shown in the appendix are the first ran for each primary
configuration option with the revenue constraint set at five million dollars. Upon completion of the
modeling runs, the optimal cost results are regressed against the output levels and the output levels
squared using multivariate no-intercept ordinary least squares. The model is run with no intercept as

the intercept term is not used in any of the final equations. Eastwood, et al. point out that this may
increase the value of

generated data, the

but in the use of regression to derive a continuous function from artificially-

values are not of critical importance. All coefficients derived from the regression

are significant at a .95 or .90 level of confidence, except the quadratic term of the conservation tillage
wheat model. Table 4.2 shows the results of the regression. The Y and
correspond to the d and g terms in the optimal control model respectively.
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terms in the regression

Table 42. Regression results of cost equation estimation.
Soybeans

Com
Conventional

Constant''

No-Till

Conventional

Wheat
Conventional

No-Till

No-Till

0

0

0

0

0

0

216557.2

702081.9

271129.8

375038.7

684555J

815650.2

.99

.99

.99

.99

.99

.99

Observations

30

30

28

28

15

15

Deg. of Freedom

28

28

26

26

13

13

1.144436

1.242335

2.61985

2.855822

2.839073

3.214053

(233.42)

(77.71)

(137.40)

(107.65)

(44.22)

(41.92)

4.7 X 10^
(41.01)

53X itr*
(14.81)

3.1 X l(r*
(23.65)

3.6 X 10"®
(19.56)

8.8 X 10^
(1.90)

5.7 X 10-*
(1.03)

Std Enorjjjj

Y Coefficient

(t-value)
Coefficient

(t-value)

''As the constant does not appear in the final equations, it was forced to zero in the regression.

The Sediment Growth Coefficient

Development of the sediment growth coefficients (Table 4.3) requires information on the

production practices being employed, the yields being received under those practices, and the erosion
resulting from those practices. While information exists on the actual erosion levels occurring on some
lands in the study area,simulated erosion levels based upon the assiunptions of the linear programming
model are deemed to best maintain the consistency of the modeling system. The estimation of erosion

under the model conditions requires a plant growth/erosion simulator.
Existing simulators appear to offer the option of plant-specific models or more general models.
A general model is selected for use in this study to maintain consistency in assumptions and modeling

techniques across different crop simulations. The selection criteria for the plant growth/erosion
simulator include:

1.

the ability to incorporate different tillage practices;

2.

the ability to incorporate a variety of aop types; and

3.

the ability to model soil movement for a wide variety of soil types and slopes.
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Table 43. Development of the sediment growth coefTicient.

Conv Till^

Erosion (tons/acre)

Soybeans

Com

Coefficient

Cons Till*

Conv Till

Wheat

Cons Till

Conv Till

Cons Til

20.06

16.09

2130

16.68

7.33

5.34

35

35

35

.35

35

35

7.02

5.63

7.42

5.84

237

237

Average Yield (bushels/acre)

120.50

11535

3831

38.36

49.45

49.80

Sediment Growth Coefficient

.0583

.0488

.1926

.1522

.0519

.0376

Sediment Delivery Ratio
Sedimentation (tons/acre)

(tons/bushel)

'^Conventional Tillage
^Conservation Tillage

Based on the above criteria, the EPIC model is used as the plant growth/erosion simulator in

this study. Although EPIC may be marginally less accurate than a simulator designed for a specific
crop,its ability to model multiple crop species is critical to this analysis. A brief description of the EPIC
model follows:

EPIC simulates the physical process involved simultaneously and realistically

using readily available mputs. Commonly used EPIC input data(weather, crop, tillage,
and soil parameters) are available from a computer filing system assembled especially
for applying EPIC throughout the U.S. Since erosion can he a relatively slow process,
EPIC is capable of simulating hundreds of years if necessary. EPIC is generally
applicable, computationally efficient (operates on a daily time step), and capable of
computing the effects of management changes on outputs.
The components of EPIC can be placed into eight major divisions for
discussion-hydrology,weather,erosion,nutrients,plant growth,soil temperature,tillage,

and economics...[The general plant growth model is used to simulate above-ground
biomass, yield, and roots for com, grain sorghum, wheat, barley, oats, peanuts,
sunflowers, soybeans, alfalfa, cotton, and grasses (Williams, et al., p. 1).
Seventy-two runs of the EPIC model are performed, incorporating every combination of the

primary model configurations with each of the 12 soil types. The production practices used are the same
as those used to develop the production cost values in the linear programming models. A 50-year
simulation is run and the average annual erosion is extracted for each of the 72 models. This results

in 12 erosion levels for each primary model configuration. A weighted average of these 12 values is
calculated, based ppon the relative percentages of soil types as shown in Table 4.1. Since the model is
based upon the erosion that reaches the water as sediment, not raw erosion, these six erosion levels are
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multiplied by the threshold sediment delivery ratio for the watershed. The threshold sediment delivery
ratio is defined as that proportion of average annual total erosion which is delivered to a significant

stream (Alexander and English). "A 'significant' stream begins where flow becomes adequate for a
beneficial use such as a municipal water supply, water-based recreation, a fishery, or domestic use."'^
Six sediment levels remain following these manipulations, one for each primary model

configuration. However,these sediment levels are expressed in tons per acre while the optimal control
model calls for sediment expressed as tons per unit output. To convert these results to the proper form,

the average output, in bushels, is calculated for each crop. A weighted average, by relative soil type as
shown in Table 4.1, is calculated from the crop yields used in the linear programming model. Dividing
the sedimentation, in tons per acre, by the average yield, in bushels per acre, results in a sediment
growth coefficient expressed in tons per bushel.

OPTIMAL DYNAMIC STRATEGIES

Numerical Solutions

The Data Modeling section of this chapter develops all of the coefficients necessary to obtain

optimal numerical solutions to our dynamical system. Table 4.4 brings that information together and
shows the coefficients for each of the six primary model configurations. Once the coefficients are
developed, the numerical solutions become straightforward.

The Optimal Tax Function

Substituting the coefficients from Table 4.4 into equation 3.41 yields the following optimal tax
functions in terms of a, b, and c:

(4.2)

Conventional Com;

'^rom an unpublished Soil Conservation Service memorandum from C Don Qark,National Sedimentation Geologist,dated
December 14, 1989.
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Table 4A. Model coefficient values.

Soybeans

Com

U\

Wheat

Coefficient

Units

Linear Cost(d)

$/bu

1.14

1.24

2.62

2.85

2.84

3.21

Quadratic Cost (g)

$/bu

4.7 X 10^

5.5 X 10^

3.1 X 10^

3.6 X 10^

8.8 X 10^

5.7 X 10^

Price (p)

$/bu

2.75

2.75

7.65

7.65

3.40

3.40

Private Discount Rate (r)

$/$

.1

.1

.1

.1

.1

.1

Social Discount Rate (d)

$/$

.05

.05

.05

.05

.05

.05

Unit Cost of Sediment(y) $/tn^

638

6.38

6.38

6.38

6.38

6.38

Sediment Decay(h)

tn/tn

.01

.01

.01

.01

.01

.01

Sediment Growth (k)

tn/bu

.0583

.0488

.1926

.1522

.0519

.0376

Average Erosion (C)

tn/ac

20.06

16.09

21.20

16.68

733

5.34

Average Yield (^)

bu/ac

120.50

115.35

38.51

38.36

49.45

49.80

English Tons

Conventional

Conservation

Conventional

Conservation

Conventional

Conservation

(43) T*=2.917-

^-911&
thtVj

(4.4)

T*-2.462—^

(43)

t*»2.974—

(4.6)

T*=1.017-

(4.7)

T*='.467-

01 lb

*-

Conservation Com;
Conventional Soybeans;

Conservation Soybeans;

^•911&
^ 91Ih

Conventional Wheat;
Conservation Wheat.

As previously discussed there is no a priori determination of unique values for a, b, and c.
Rather, these variables represent the range of relative weights that society can place on the different

benefits represented in the model. As indicated following equation 3.23, these values are restricted such
that a*b+c^l; 0

1; 0<<;^ 1. It is assumed for the empirical analysis that tax revenue (c) is not

the primary piu^ose of such a policy and is not of primary concern to society relative to agricultural
production and environmental quality. However, it is also clear from equations 4.2 through 4.7 that the
value of c cannot be zero. Thus, the value of c is initially held to .1. Theoretically, of course, there is
no reason not to explore the effects of varying the value of c but the number of permutations of all three
coefficients quickly becomes intractable. As this study in intended to focus on the tradeoffs between

agricultural production and environmental quality, only variations in the a and b coefficients are
observed in this section. In developing the policy frontier, however, the value of c is varied and the
results are graphically demonstrated.

Table 4.5 shows the value of t* for each primary model configuration. With c assumed to have

a value of .1, the values of a and b can each vary between 0 and .9. Since both agricultural production
and environmental quality, in some amount, are necessary for survival, the case in which either a orb
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Table 4^. Optimal tax values by primary model configuration and level of social importance.
a/b
(c-.l)

Com

Com

Soytieans

Soybeans

Wheat

Wheat

Conventional

Conservation

Conventional

Conservation

Conventional

Conservation

Dollars per Ton

.1/.8

9.49

9.73

9.41

9.83

7.75

6.99

21-7

8.18

833

8.16

8.49

637

531

2/.6

6.86

6.94

6.91

7.15

4.80

3.62

A/S

5.54

534

5.66

5.81

3.33

1.93

S/A

4.23

4.15

4.41

4.47

1.86

0.25

.6/.3

2.91

2.75

3.15

3.12

0.38

-1.44

nil

1.60

136

1.90

1.78

-1.09

-3.13

&I.1

0.28

-0.04

0.65

0.44

-236

-4.81

£ire zero is omitted and the coefficients are allowed to vary between .1 and .8. In fact, the actual value

of such coefficients is not likely to approach either extreme due to the importance to society of both
commodities. In several cases, the value of the optimal tax becomes negative as the weights move

toward favoring agriculture, indicating that a subsidy to agriculture may be the optimal path for society.
These optimal tax values may be thought of as the value of externalities imposed upon society,
weighted by the V2due society places on the competing goods of agricultural production and
environmental quality. A non-weighted value, the level of pure economic transfer, may be obtained by
solvmg the system again without the a, b, or c coefficients:

(4s'j T
^'
'

kQ.h*b)

ph(h+6) , yh
ki2h*&) (2A+5)'

The economic transfer equations result in the values shown in Table 4.6, which represent the

actual transfer of value from society to agricultural producers for each of the primary model

configurations. These economic transfer values are just over three dollars per ton for com and
soybeans, and are substantially lower for wheat.
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Table 4.6. External costs of agricultural production borne by society.
Commodity

Value of Economic Zero Production Tax
Transfer

Level

Full Production Tax
Level

Dollars/Ton
Conventional Com

3.11

3.04

2.04

Conservation Com

335

3.40

2.07

Conventional Soybeans

3.03

2.87

234

Conservation Soybeans

3.45

3.47

2.54

Conventional Wheat

137

1.19

033

Conservation Wheat

0.61

0.56

-0.22

Some clues to the effect on the optimal tax of a change from conventional tillage to
conservation tillage planting are provided in Table 43. When society values the environment

significantly higher than agricultiu'e, the change in the optimal tax for conservation tillage relative to
conventional tillage is much smaller than when agriculture is weighted more favorably. In effect, the
conservation tillage scenarios are always more sensitive to changes in a and b than the conventional
scenarios. With the exception of wheat, however, the optimal tax values tend to converge with the values
of a and b, giving similar results near the middle of the range. As shown in the Optimal Production

Function section, the physical processes constrain the problem to these middle values such that the
difference between tillage practices becomes insignificant to the problem as a whole, at least in this
specific empirical application.

The Optimal Production Function

Substituting the coefficients from Table 4.4 and the optimal tax levels arising from equations

4.2 through 4.7 into equation 3.16 yields the optimal production fimctions facing the producers in this
area:

(4.9)

y= 1.713X10*-5.638xlO^T

Conventional Com;
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(4.10)

1.373 X10*-4.033xlO't

Conservation Com;

(4.11) y=8.113 X lO'-2.824 x lO't

Conventional Soybeans;

(4.12) y-6.667 X10'-1.922 X10'T

Conservation Soybeans;

(4.13) y=3.182xl0'-2.681 xlO't

Conventional Wheat;

(4.14) y» 1.667X10'-2.998xIO't

Conservation Wheat.

Substituting the values of t* as shown in Table 4.5 into equations 4.9 through 4.14 yields the

optimal production levels for each primary model configuration by tax level (Table 4.7). One obvious
attribute of Table 4.7 is that,for all primary model configurations,the production level becomes negative

as the social weights move toward environmental quality and away from agricultural production. For

each crop, there exists a tax level at which producers would no longer find it profitable to produce the
commodity in question. They would either shift production to a different crop or leave agriculture
altogether. The negative values in Table 4.7 suggest that this level of taxation is well within the range
of those taxes which would otherwise be considered socially optimal. Given the profit structure of

Table 4.7. Optimal production levels by primary model configuration and level of social Importance.
alb
(c-.l)

Com

Com

Soybeans

Soybeans

Wheat

Wheat

Conventional

Conservation

Conventional

Conservation

Conventional

Conservation

Bushels

.1/.8

-3.64 X 10*

-235 X 10*

-1.85 X 10*

-1.22 X 10*

-1.76 X 10*

-1.93 X 10*

Ij.l

-2.90 X 10*

-1.99 X 10*

-1.49 X 10*

-9.65 X 10'

-136 X 10*

-1.42 X 10*

3/.6

-2.16 X 10*

-1.43 X 10*

-1.14 X 10*

-7.07 X lO'

-9.69 X lo'

-9.19 X 10'

.4/5

-1.41 X 10*

-8.63 X 10'

-7.87 X 10'

4.49 X 10'

-5.74 X 10'

4.13 X 10'

3/.4

-6.71 X lO'

-3.00 X 10'

-4.33 X lo'

-1.91 X lo'

-1.79 X lO'

9.27 X 10*

A/3

7.08 X 10*

2.62 X lO'

-7.94 X 10*

6.65 X 10*

116 X lo'

5.98 X 10'

.1(2

8.13 X 10'

8.25 X lo'

174 X lo'

335 X 10'

6.11 X 10'

1.10 X 10*

Z/A

U5 X 10*

139 X 10*

6.28 X 10'

5.82 X lo'

1.01 X 10*

1.61 X 10*
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agriculture in the study area, producers of certain commodities simply cannot afford to absorb the total
cost of their production externalities and remain in business.

To examine this issue, the production level, Y, is set to zero and equation 3.16 is rearranged
to isolate r:

(4.15)

This indicates the tax level at which production of the commodity would become unprofitable and,
presumably, would cease. The zero production level tax is shown for each primary model configuration

in Table 4.6." Not surprisingly, those crops which are more profitable in the absence of a tax are able
to sustain higher tax levels before becoming unprofitable. These levels may be thought of as a maximum

tax imposed by the physioeconomic system regardless of the theoretical social weights applied. Similarly,
there is a tax level for each commodity, less than the zero tax level, at which all of the resources of the

area will be placed in use. Equation 3.16 is again rearranged, this time leaving the variable Y explicit
in the equation:

(4.16) x'-i-p*d*2gY)^.
The full production tax levels for each primary model configuration are shown in Table 4.6.
Any tax below these levels will not affect the production decisions of farmers. Each zero tax level and

full production tax level is associated with a pair of values of a and b. This effectively sets a bound on
the range of social weights which can affect production of agricultural products. The range of possible
social weights falls between .4/.5 and .7/.2 for a/b. This suggests that severely skewed social weights
are not sustainable imder the conditions in the study area. It may, perhaps, be inferred from this limited

application that the importance of both goods to a healthy society may preclude an extreme bias in

"As crop prices are exogenous to the model, these results assume no change in price as a result of the hypothetical zero
production.
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either direction. Since price is a determinant of this range, the market itself may act exogenously as a
stabilizing force.

Sensitivity Analysis

As discussed early in this chapter, a mathematical model is not amenable to statistical
verification. In attempting to verify a mathematical model through other means, an important factor
in iinHp.rsfanding the model is the sensitivity of the model results to changes in its components. The
conventional com model configuration is used as a base for the sensitivity analysis. Each coefficient

contained in equations 3.41 and 3.16 is increased by 50% and the resulting percentage change is
recorded in each of three result parameters: external production costs,zero tax level, and full production
tax level The results are shown in Table 4.8.

Table 4.8. Effect on various tax levels of a 50 percent increase in equation parameters.
Original

Tax
Parameter

d

g

r

P

S

y

h

k

Value
Dollars

(Percent Change)
Economic

3.11

Transfer
2^ro

3.04

Production
104

Full
Production

2.19

3.11

5.14

4.29

2.97

3J7

3.20

239

(-.30)

(.00)

(.65)

(J8)

(-.05)

(.15)

(.03)

(-.23)

1.96

3.04

5.64

4.42

3.04

3.04

3.18

U7

(-•36)

(.00)

(.86)

(.45)

(.00)

(.00)

(.05)

(-55)

0.96

1J3

4.64

2.97

2.04

2.04

2.13

158

(--53)

(-25)

(1.27)

(.46)

(.00)

(.00)

(.04)

(-32)

The linear and quadratic cost coefficients, d and g respectively, are estimated using the linear

programming algorithm as explained in the Data Modeling section of this chapter. The tax levels are
moderately sensitive to changes in the linear cost coefficient, d. The full production tax level is also
somewhat sensitive to the quadratic cost coefficient,g; however, both the level of external costs and the
zero tax level are not functions ofg and are not affected. Another interesting note is that the range of

optimal values of Y is tied to the value of g. In this application,g is very small as the cropland used in
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the linear programming model is relatively homogeneous. Mathematically, as g increases, the range of
optimal production values decreases.

The tax levels are moderately sensitive to changes in the private instantaneous annual rate of
discount, r. This is not unexpected as the results are strongly tied to the profitability of agricultural

production over time. In contrast, the social instantaneous aimual rate of discount, <5, has very little
effect on the results of the model. Its effect on external costs is only five percent, and it has no effect

on the zero or full production tax rates. The model is similarly insensitive to changes in the unit cost
of sediment, y. The change in gamma increases external costs by only 15 percent, and has no effect on
the zero and full production tax levels.

The model is quite sensitive to changes in price,p. The 50 percent increase in price results in

a 65 percent, 86 percent, and 127 percent change in external costs, zero production tax level, and full
production tax level, respectively. Due to the importance of prices to the model results, the sensitivity
analysis is extended for this variable to consider the sensitivity of the other model configurations to more

drastic changes in price. For the com and wheat configurations, the model is solved for the economic
transfer value under current loan rate levels and under ciurent target price levels. There is no target

price for soybeans, so the model results under the loan rate price level is compared to the market price
used in the base analysis. The loan rates used for com,soybeans, and wheat are $1.96 per bushel, $4.50
per bushel, and $2.44 per bushel, respectively (Loewen, et al.). The target prices used for com and

wheat are $2.75" per bushel and $4.00 per bushel respectively (Loewen, et al.).
For conventional com, the economic transfer value varies from $1.95 per ton under the loan

rate to $3.11 per ton under the target price. The ranges are $1.96 to $3.35 per ton for conservation
com,$-0.22 to $236 per ton for conventional wheat, and $-138 to $1.98 per ton for conservation wheat.
The economic transfer values vary from $1.63 per ton under the loan rate price to $3.03 per ton under
the base market price for conventional soybeans, and $1.68 to $3.45 per ton for conservation soybeans.

'*lt may be noted that J2.75 per bushel is also the price used for com in the base analysis. That value does not represent
the target price, but the market price for that year.
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The wide variation in model results under different price scenarios emphasizes the importance of price
p-gfimatinn in this model. While historical price figures are generally accurate and relatively easy to

obtain, it is important to remember that price is exogenous to this model and that this model is sensitive
to the price variable. Changes in price over time would require revisiting the model to update the
results.

Only two physical coefficients appear in the final equations. The external costs, zero production
tax level, and full production tax level are moderately sensitive to the sediment growth coefficient, k.
The entire model is insensitive to changes in the sediment decay coefficient, h. The effect of h on

external costs, zero production tax levels, and full production tax levels is only three percent, five
percent, and four percent, respectively.

The Dynamic Policy Frontier

One of the key features of this model is in the ability of the modeler to develop solutions
independent of policy goals. This approach "does not require the prior articulation of policy preferences,

and by parameterizing on policy goals it allows policy frontiers to be generated which provide a
configuration of tradeoffs and policy options suitable for use by decision makers and other policy actors"

(Sylvia and Anderson, p.2). The parameterization of relative weights,a, b, and c, in the model provides
for a range of answers as shown in the Numerical Solutions section of this chapter. An additional
benefit is the ability to graphically represent the relationship between the optimal tax function and the
values of a, b, and c.

The weight society places on agricultural production is represented by variable a; variable b is
the weight society places on water quality, and variable c is the value society places in receiving tax

revenues from agricultural production. The variables are constrained such that a+h+c = l, and
0^a,h<l; 0<c^l. In the graphs which follow, the optimal tax rate is shown on the vertical axis and
the variable a is shown on the horizontal axis. Each line in the graphs represents a constant value of
c. The value of b can be calculated for any given point as h = l -a-c; however, the scale of b changes
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for each value of c so it is not shown explicitly.'^ The graphical policy frontiers for each primary model
configuration are shown in Figures 43 through 4.8.

The dynamic policy frontiers for com and soybeans, regardless of tillage practice, are quite
similar. The frontiers for wheat are similar to each other, but vary from those of com and soybeans in

that they show significant negative values for higher levels of c. In each case, while discrete lines are
plotted, the frontier should be thought of as a surface. It is important to acknowledge that the shape
of these frontier surfaces are not completely defined by the analytical model. The characteristic shared
by each of these frontier siu-faces, in that optimal tax values grow smaller with increases in c, may not
be consistent in other applications of the model.

choice of a is aibitraiy. Variable b could have been explicitly shown on the horizontal axis, with a implicit, if a
researcher so chose.
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Figure 4J. Dynamic poiicy frontier for conventional com.
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Figure 4.4. Dynamic policy frontier for conservation com.
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Figure 4.6. Dynamic poiicy frontier for conservation soybeans.
66

C-.1

Optimal Tox Level ($/ton)
25

20

15

10

c—.7

(5)

C-.6

C-.5

c—.4.

C—.3

c —.2

C-.1

X

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Soclol Preference for Agricultural Production

Figure 4.7. Dynamic policy frontier for conventional wheat.
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Figure 4.8. Dynamic policy frontier for conservation wheat
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CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

BACKGROUND

Agricultural topsoil is one of the critical natural resources of a civilization. This delicate layer

of our planet is the primary source of sustenance for human and animal populations. Arable soil is
necessary to feed, clothe, and shelter human beings and is a prerequisite for achieving the aspirations
of a society. Without adequate arable land, a civilization will find it difficult to thrive, or even survive
(Browning; Napier and Forster). Thus, the potential of a society is largely dependent upon the topsoil
of its agricultural lands (Napier and Forster).

While the importance of topsoil and the problem of topsoil loss have long been recognized,
more than 40 years of cooperative efforts between farmers and the federal government have done little
to check the erosion of our farmland (McConnell; Napier and Forster; Rasmussen,1982; Walker). Onethird of U.S. cropland topsoil has been lost in the last 200 years (Walker), and erosion continues at a
significant rate (USDA/SCS, 1980).

Increased public awareness of these issues continues to put pressiue on policymakers to solve
oiu' environmental problems while maintaining an abundant, inexpensive food supply. Policy debates,
past and present, have focused primarily on physical actions to be taken rather than upon policy goals
and objectives (Robinson, K.). Yet the use of physical goals of soil loss is often challenged by
economists who argue that it is not the physical loss from the farm that is important, but the costs
inciured by loss of topsoil and offsite damages from agricultmally-generated sedimentation (Robinson,
K.). Offsite sediment damages are far greater than onsite productivity damages.

The objective of this study was to develop a soil conservation policy model, incorporating the
objectives of both producers and policymakers, that: 1) estimates the economic transfers between
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agricultural producers and society resulting from agricultural production and its associated sedimentbased externalities, and 2)estimates a socially optimal level of taxation, given varying levels of perceived
importance to society of agriculture versus environmental quality.

Several specific elements are necessary for the development of a soil erosion policy model.

Those elements include modeling (1) the interaction of producer and policymaker (Anderson and Lee;
Candler, et al.; Candler and Norton; Sharp and Bromley, Sylvia and Anderson),(2) the dynamic natme

of the sedimentation process (Ervin, et al.; Rausser, 1980; Swanson, 1982), and (3) the recognition of
multiple, competing goals of the policymaker (Rausser and Yassoiu",Sylvia and Anderson; Van Kooten,

et al.). The model used is an adaptation of the multi-level programming concept developed by Candler
and Norton and extended by Sylvia and Anderson. A multi-level optimal control model was developed

which optimizes the producer's dynamic problem in the first stage, then uses the producer's optimal
decision paths in the second stage as components of the policymakers' dynamic problem. The second
stage problem utilizes weights indicating the relative importance of the policymaker's competing goals.

Those weights are used to construct a dynamic policy frontier demonstrating the relationships between
various policy goals and the resulting optimal solution paths.

The model was applied to a three-county area in west Tennessee composed of Obion, Weakley,

and Gibson counties. These three counties are located in the area categorized by the Soil Conservation
Service as the Southern Mississippi Valley Silty Uplands, or Major Land Resource Area (134)

(USDA/SCS, 1981). The region is also referred to as the Southern Plateau Slope (Mundy and Gray).
With elevations ranging from 25 to 100 meters (USDA/SCS, 1981), this is the region that joins the
Mississippi bottomlands with the Cumberland Plateau. The majority of the land in the area is used for
agriculture, with com, soybeans and wheat being the primary crops.

RESULTS

The model provided information on the rates of taxation that would optimize the resources of
both society and farmers given the preference of society for agricultural output versus environmental
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quality. These optimal tax rates represent the transfer of costs from the agricultural producer to society
as a whole. The optimal tax rates were then substituted into the optimal production function for
agricultural producers to determine the level of production that may be expected to result given the
underlying profit structure of agricultural production and the tax rate applied. The model was applied
separately to com, soybeans and wheat in the study area.

Effective optimal taxes were determined which would result in a range of production from zero

to full production, and were identified as a bound on tax rates which would be expected to affect levels
of agricultural production. The range of taxes, from full to zero production, respectively, were
$2.04 - $3.04 for conventional corn, $2.07 - $3.40 for conservation com, $2.24 - $2.87 for conventional

soybeans, $234 - $3.47 for conservation soybeans, $033 - $1.19 for conventional wheat, and
$-0.22 - $036 for conservation wheat. All values are in dollars per ton of sediment.

Tax rates less than the fiill production tax rate are expected to reduce society's cost of
agricultural production without reducing output of the commodity being modeled. Tax levels in the
effective range are expected to both reduce agricultural output of the commodity, to reduce offsite
sediment damages from agricultural production, and to reduce the cost to society of remaining

agricultural production." Tax levels greater than the zero production level are expected to result in
a complete shift in production from the commodity being modeled to some other enterprise. The model
does not address what new enterprise that would be, nor its relative environmental impacts.

External costs of production were also calculated to indicate the absolute transfer to society,
without regard to social preferences, of offsite sedimentation costs arising from agricultural production.

The external costs, in dollars per ton of sediment, are $3.11 for conventional com,$3.35 for conservation
com,$3.03 for conventional soybeans,$3.45 for conservation soybeans,$1.37 for conventional wheat,and
$0.61 for conservation wheat.

"As crop prices are exogenous to the model, these results assume no change in price as a result of
the hypothetical zero production.
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An analysis was performed of the sensitivity of the external costs, the zero production tax level
and the full production tax level to changes in the model coefHcients. The model was extremely

sensitive to changes in price; moderately sensitive to changes in the linear cost coefficient, the private

instantaneous rate of discount, and the sediment growth coefficient; and relatively insensitive to changes
in the quadratic cost coefficient, the social instantaneous rate of discount, the unit cost of offsite
sediment damages, and the sediment decay coefficient.

A dynamic policy frontier was constructed for each commodity. The frontier is a schedule of

the relationship between the optim2d tax levels and their associated social preference values. The

dynamic policy frontiers for the study area showed more variation by crop than by tillage practice,
indicating that tillage practice may affect erosion costs less than crop selection and land characteristics.

LIMITATIONS

The study attempted to estimate the economic transfers between agricultural producers and
society resulting from agricultural production and its associated sediment-based externalities. As is
characteristic of mathematical models, some concessions had to be made in the name of mathematical

tractability. While the model is able to address both the producer's problem and the policymaker's
problem, each optimal control sub-model is constrained to one state variable and one control variable.

While the policymaker's model expresses a second equation of motion in equation 3.22, that equation
satisfies the constraint, becoming zero due to assumptions in the producer's model. The model would
be rendered analytically insolvable if this constraint were violated; however, such a constraint could be
abandoned in a purely numerical model.

The results of these constraints affect the model assumptions in several ways. The assumption

that the producer can only control erosion through entering or removing land from production is a result
of requiring only a single control variable for the producer. Thus, the model is unable to deal
endogenously with changes in production practices, such as the shift from conventional to conservation

tillage. While the empirical results in this study demonstrate that such changes are less effective than
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changes in the amount ofland cultivated, this restriction must be considered to be a significant limitation
of the system.

Another assumption resulting from these constraints is that of the exogenous price level. It was
shown in the sensitivity analysis that the model is particularly sensitive to price, yet the model is unable

to adapt to such changes endogenously. This introduces an implicit assumption that the 1988 prices will
remain in effect throughout the application of the model, and that producers hold the expectation that
prices will remain constant. The constant price assumption causes the result shown in equation 3.15,
that the change in the producer's optimal production over time is equal to zero. Without this

assumption, the second equation of motion in equation 3.22 would be non-zero and the model would
be analytically insolvable.

Other constraints arise from the difficulty in estimating empirical parameters in the application
of the model. The economic cost relationships were artificially generated, based upon theoretical rather

than empirical relationships. This lack of empirical data limits the applicability of the model to other
areas. Similarly, data on the decay of sediment was unavailable and had to be estimated as a
generalized approximation of a large region. While better data were available from which to construct
the sediment growth coefficient the model is limited in the inability to use the full range of data. The

study area includes production on 12 soil types, yet the sediment growth coefficient is reduced to a single
value. Since this value is based upon a weighted average of available cropland soil type, the sediment

growth coefficient implicitly assumes proportional production on all soils types at every level of
production.

FURTHER RESEARCH

A study of this nature requires combining information from various fields of study, including
economics, plant and soil science, hydrology, mathematics, and public policy. Many of the limitations
of the model were based upon limitations in the mathematical tools applicable to applied economics.
Further research into multiple-state, multiple control extensions of optimal control theory is suggested.
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Numerical applications are most promising in this area, but data is lacking. Thus, additional research
is needed in developing an empirical data base of production costs, yields, erosion, and hydrological
characteristics of a variety of watersheds across the country.

Specific research suggestions include the addition of multiple controls to both the producer and

policymaker sub-models, the inclusion of price an endogenous variable in the modeling system, and the
econometric estimation of agricultural cost functions. Applications and adaptations of this model may

also be useful in examining a variety of policy-related issues in natmal resource and environmental
economics.
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APPENDIX

LINEAR PROGRAMMING MODELS

STITLE MLRA 134 CORN MODEL - CONSERVATION TILLAGE
SOFFUPPER
SETS

ACTIVITIES Each crop as produced on a specific soil type
/ CORNAD, CORNBI, CORNCA, CORNCL, CORNCV, CORNFA, CORNGR,
CORNLX, CORNLO, CORNME, CORNPR, CORNWA /
RESOURCES

/ ADLER, BIRDS, CALLOWAI, COLLINS, CONVENT, FALAYA, GRENADA,
LEXINGTON, LORRING, MEMPHIS, PROV, WAVERLY /
TABLE LANDUSE(ACTIVITIES, RESOURCES)

Land use by crop and soil type

aht fh birds CALLOWAY COLLINS CONVENT FALAYA QIENADA LEXINGTON LORRING MEMPHIS PROV WAVERLY
CORNAD

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

CORNBI

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

CORNCA

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

CORNCL

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

CORNCV

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

CORNFA

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

CORNGR

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

CORNLX

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

CORNLO

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

CORNME

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

CORNPR

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

CORNWA

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

PARAMETERS

RECEIPTS(ACTIVITIES) Total Receipts
/ CORNAD - 385.00, CORNBI - 217.25,
CORNCV - 305.25, CORNFA - 288.75,
CORNLO - 346.50, CORNME - 360.25,

(Dollars
CORNCA CORNGR CORNPR -

Per Acre)
321.75, CORNCL - 368.50,
319.00, CORNLX - 346.50,
264.00, CORNWA - 187.00 /

RES(RESOURCES)

/ ADLER - 8881, BIRDS - 5609, CALLOWAY - 38327, COLLINS - 59360,
CONVENT - 3739, FALAYA - 78991, GRENADA - 73382, LEXINGTON - 7011,
LORRING - 108903, MEMPHIS - 28511, PROV - 18229, WAVERLY - 36457 /
COSTS(ACTIVITIES)

Costs (Dollars Per Acre)

/ CORNAD - 168.09, CORNBI
CORNCV - 187.56, CORNFA
CORNLO - 179.90, CORNME
SCALAR

REVENUE

178.52, CORNCA
188.05, CORNGR
188.93, CORNPR

180.45, CORNCL - 180.80,
181.43, CORNLX - 168.25,
163.93, CORNWA • 186.98 /

/ 5000000 /

VARIABLES

MIX(ACTIVITIES)

Mix of production activities

TCOST

Value of objective function

POSITIVE VARIABLE MIX

EQUATIONS
TOTALR

Revenue Calculation & Constraint

c:ap(Resources)

Capacity Constraints
Accounting; Costs;

TOTALC

TOTALR..
SUM(ACTIVITIES, RECEIPTS(ACTIVITIES) * MIX(ACTIVITIES)) -G- REVENUE;
CAP(RESOURCES).. SUM(ACTIVITIES, LANDUSE(ACTIVITIES, RESOURCES) * MIX(ACTIVITIES)) -L+ RHS(RESOURCES);
TOTALC..
TCOST -E- SUM(ACTIVITIES, COSTS(ACTIVITIES) * MIX(ACTIVITIES));
MODEL CRNCNS No Till Cost Problem / ALL /; SOLVE CRNCNS MINIMIZING TCOST USING LP;

Figure A.1. Linear programming model for conservation com.
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0

1;

STITLE MLRA 13A CORH MODEL - COHVENTIONAL TILLAGE

SOFFUPPER
SETS

ACTIVITIES Each crop as produced on a specific soli type
CORNAD, CORNBI, CORHCA, CORKCL, CORNCV, CORNFA, CORNGR.
CORNLX, CORHLO, CORNME, CQRNPR, CQRNWA /
RESOURCES

/ ADLER, BIRDS, CALLOHAY, COLLINS, CONVENT, FALAYA, (RtENAOA,
LEXINGTON, LORRING, MEMPHIS, PROV, WAVERLY /

TABLE LANDUSE(ACTIVITIES, RESOURCES)

Land use by crop and soli typo

ADLER BIRDS CALLOWAY COLLINS CONVENT FALAYA GRENADA LEXINGTON LORRING MEMPHIS PROV WAVERLY
CORNAD

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

CORNBI

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

CORNCA

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
0

0

CORNCL

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

CORNCV

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

CORNFA

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

CORNGR

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

CORNLX

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

CORNLO

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

CORNME

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

CORNPR

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

CORNWA

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

PARAMETERS

RECEIPTS(ACTIVITIES) Total Receipts
/ CORNAD - 423.50, CORNBI - 220.00,
CORNCV - 338.25, CORNFA - 338.25,
CORNLO - 354.75, CORNME - 371.25,

(Dollars
CORNCA CORNGR CORNPR -

Per Acre)
321.75, CORNCL - 407.00,
305.25, CORNLX - 338.25,
253.00, CORNWA - 187.00 /

RHS(RESOURCES)

/ ADLER - 8881, BIRDS - 5609, CALLOWAY - 38327, COLLINS - 59360,
CONVENT - 3739, FALAYA - 78991, GRENADA - 73382, LEXINGTON - 7011,
LORRING - 108903, MEMPHIS - 28511, PROV - 18229, WAVERLY - 36457 /
COSTS(ACTIVITIES)

Costs (Dollars Per Acre)

/ CORNAD - 161.27, CORNBI - 180.70, CORNCA
CORNCV - 180.74, CORNFA - 181.23, CORNGR
CORNLO - 173.08, CORNME - 182.11, CORNPR
SCALAR

REVENUE

173.63, CORNCL - 173.98,
174.61, CORNLX - 161.43,
157.11, CORNWA - 180.16 /

/ 5000000 /

VARIABLES

MIX(ACTIVITIES)
TCOST

Mix of production activities
Value of objective function

POSITIVE VARIABLE MIX

EQUATIONS
TOTALR

Revenue Calculation & Constraint

CAP(RESOURCES)

Capacity Constraints
Accounting: Costs;

TOTALC

TOTALR..
SUM(ACTIVITIES, RECEIPTS(ACTIVITIES) * MIX(ACTIVITIES)) -G- REVENUE;
CAP(RESOURCES).. SUM(ACTIVITIES, LANDUSE(ACTIVITIES, RESOURCES) • MIX(ACTIVITIES)) -L+ RHS(RESOURCES);

TOTALC..
TCOST -E- SUM(ACTIVITIES, COSTS(ACTIVITIES) • MIX(ACTIVITIES));
MODEL CRNCNV Conventional Till Cost Problem / ALL /; SOLVE CRNCNV MINIMIZING TCOST USING LP;

Figure K2. Linear programming model for conventional tillage com.
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STITLE MLRA 134 SOYBEAH MODEL - CONSERVATION TILLAGE
SOFTUPPER
SETS

ACTIVITIES Each crop as pcoducad on a specific soli type
/ SOYAD, SOYBI, SOYCA, SOYCL, SOYCV, SOYFA, SOYGR,
SOYLX, SOYLO, SOYME, SOYER, SOYWA /
RESOURCES

/ ADLER, BIROS, CALLOHAY, COLLINS, CONVENT, FALAYA, C^iENADA,
LEXINGTON, LORRING, MEMPHIS, PROV, WAVERLY /
TABLE LANDUSE(ACTIVITIES, RESOURCES)

Land use by crop and soli type

ADLER BIRDS CALLOWAY COLLINS CONVENT FALAYA GRENADA LEXINGTON LORRING MEMPHIS PROV WAVERLY
SOYAD

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

SOYBI

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

SOYCA

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

SOYCL

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

SOYCV

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

SOYFA

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

Q

0

0

0

SOYGR

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0
0

SOYLX

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

SOYLO

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

SOYME

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

SOYPR

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

SOYWA

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

PARAMETERS

RECEIPTS(ACTIVITIES) Total Receipts (Dollars Per Acre)
/ SOYAD - 260.10, SOYBI - 275.40, SOYCA - 321.30, SOYCL - 351.90,
SOYCV - 290.70, SOYFA - 290.70, SOYGR - 260.10, SOYLX - 260.10,
SOYLO - 313.65, SOYME - 306.00, SOYPR - 183.60, SOYWA - 244.80 /
RHS(RESOURCES)

/ ADLER - 8881, BIRDS - 5609, CALLOWAY - 38327, COLLINS - 59360,
CONVENT - 3739, FALAYA - 78991, GRENADA - 73382, LEXINGTON - 7011,
LORRING - 108903, MEMPHIS - 28511, PROV - 18229, WAVERLY - 36457 /
COSTS(ACTIVITIES)

Costs (Dollars Per Acre)

/ SOYAD - 126.65, SOYBI - 136.09, SOYCA - 132.53, SOYCL - 136.95,
SOYCV - 136.23, SOYFA - 136.65, SOYGR - 134.63, SOYLX - 126.65,
SOYLO - 134.86, SOYME - 135.17, SOYPR - 126.65, SOYWA - 136.41 /
SC:ALAR

REVENUE

/ 5000000 /

VARIABLES

MIX(ACTIVITIES)

Mix of production activities

TCOST

Value of objective ftmction

POSITIVE VARIABLE MIX

EQUATIONS
TOTALR

Revenue Calculation & Constraint

CAP(RESOURCES)

Capacity Constraints
Accounting: Costs;

TOTALC

TOTALR..
SUM(ACTIVITIES, RECEIPTS(ACTIVITIES) * MIX(ACTIVITIES)) -G- REVENUE;
CAP(RESOURCES).. SUM(ACTIVITIES, LANDUSE(ACTIVITIES, RESOURCES) * MIX(ACTIVITIES)) -L+ RHS(RESOURCES);
TOTALC..
TCOST -E- SUM(ACTIVITIES, COSTS(ACTIVITIES) • MIX(ACTIVITIES));
MODEL SOYCNS No Till Cost Problem / ALL /; SOLVE SOYCNS MINIMIZING TCOST USING LP;

Figure AJ. Linear programming modei for conservation soybeans.
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$IITL£ MLSA 134 SOYBEAN MODEL - CONVENTIONAL TILLAGE
SOFFUPPER
SETS

ACTIVITIES Each crop aa produced on a specific soli type
/ SOYAD, SOYBI, SOYCA, SOYCL, SOYCV, SOYFA, SOYGR,
SOYLX, SOYLO, SOYME, SOYPR, SOYWA /
RESOURCES

/ ADLER, BIROS, CALLOWAY, COLLINS, CONVENT, FALAYA, GRENADA,
LEXINGTON, LORRING, MEMPHIS, PROV, WAVERLY /
TABLE LANDUSE(ACTIVITIES, RESOURCES)

Land use by crop and soli type

ADLER BIRDS CALLOWAY COLLINS CONVENT FALAYA GRENADA LEXINGTON LORRING MEMPHIS PROV WAVERLY
0

SOYAD

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

SOYBI

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

SOYCA

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
0

SOYCL

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

SOYCV

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

SOYFA

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

SOYGR

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

SOYLX

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

SOYLO

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

SOYME

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

SOYPR

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

SOYWA

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

PARAMETERS

RECEIPTS(ACTIVITIES) Total Receipts (Dollars Per Acre)
/ SOYAD - 351.90, SOYBI - 275.40, SOYCA - 321.30, SOYCL - 351.90,
SOYCV - 290.70, SOYFA - 290.70, SOYGR - 267.75, SOYLX - 260.10,
SOYLO - 306.00, SOYME - 306.00, SOYPR - 183.60, SOYWA - 244.80 /
rhs(R£sourc:es)

/ ADLER - 8881, BIRDS - 5609, CALLOWAY - 38327, COLLINS - 59360,
CONVENT - 3739, FALAYA - 78991, GRENADA - 73382, LEXINGTON - 7011,
LORRING - 108903, MEMPHIS - 28511, PROV - 18229, WAVERLY - 36457 /
COSTS(ACTIVITIES)

Costs (Dollars Per Acre)

/ SOYAD - 115.34, SOYBI
SOYCV - 124.92, SOYFA
SOYLO - 123.55, SOYME
SCALAR

REVENUE

124.78, SOYCA
125.34, SOYGR
123.86, SOYPR

121.22, SOYCL - 125.64,
123.32, SOYLX - 115.34,
115.34, SOYWA - 125.10 /

/ 5000000 /

VARIABLES

MIX(ACTIVITIES)
TCOST

Mix of production activities
Value of objective function

POSITIVE VARIABLE MIX

EQUATIONS
TOTALR

Revenue Calculation & Constraint

CAP(RESOURCES)

Capacity Constraints
Accounting: Costs;

TOTALC

TOTALR..
SUM(ACTIVITIES, RECEIPTS(ACTIVITIES) * MIX(ACTIVITIES)) -G- REVENUE;
CAP(RESOURCES).. SUM(ACTIVITIES, LANDUSE(ACTIVITIES, RESOURCES) * MIX(ACTIVITIES)) -L+ RHS(RESOURCES);

TOTALC..
TCOST -E- SUM(ACTIVITIES, COSTS(ACTIVITIES) * MIX(ACTIVITIES));
MODEL SOYCNV Conventional Till Cost Problem / ALL /; SOLVE SOYCNV MINIMIZING TCOST USING LP;

Figure A.4. Linear programming model for conventional tiliage soybeans.
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STITLE MLRA 134 WHEAT MODEL

CONSERVATION TILLAGE

SOFFUPPER
SETS

ACTIVITIES Each crop aa produced on a apaclflc soil type
/ WHEATAD, WHEATBI, WHEATCA, WHEATCL, WHEATCV, WHEATFA, WHEATGR,
WHEATLX, WHEATLO, WHEATME, WHEATPR, WHEATWA /
SESOimCES

/ ADLER, BIRDS, GALLOWAY, COLLINS, CONVENT, FALAYA, GRENADA,
LEXINGTON, LORRING, MEMPHIS, PROV, WAVERLY /
TABLE LANDUSECACTIVITIES, RESOURCES)

Land use by crop and soil type

ADLER BIRDS GALLOWAY COLLINS CONVENT FALAYA atENADA LEXINGTON LORRING MEMPHIS PROV WAVERLY
WHEATAD

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

WHEATBI

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

WHEATCA

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

WHEATCL

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

WHEATCV

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

WHEATFA

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

WHEAT(ai

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

WHEATLX

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

WHEATLO

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

WHEATME

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

WHEATPR

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

WHEATWA

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

PARAMETERS

RECEIPTS(ACTIVITIES) Total Receipts (Dollars Per Acre)
180.20,
/ WHEATAD - 180.20, WHEATBI - 000.00, WHEATCA - 166.60, WHEATCL
187.00,
WHEATCV - 125.80, WHEATFA - 119.00, WHEATGR - 176.80, WHEATLX
WHEATLO - 197.20, WHEATME - 176.80, WHEATPR - 146.20, WHEATWA - 000.00 /
RHS(RESOURCES)

/ ADLER - 8881, BIRDS - 5609, GALLOWAY - 38327, COLLINS - 59360,
CONVENT - 3739, FALAYA - 78991, (SIENADA - 73382, LEXINGTON - 7011,
LCKRING - 108903, MEMPHIS - 28511, PROV - 18229, WAVERLY - 36457 /
COSTS(ACTIVITIES) Costs (Dollars Per Acre)
/ WHEATAD - 114.31, WHEATBI - 129.28, WHEATCA
WHEATCV - 128.70, WHEATFA - 131.68, WHEATGR
WHEATLO - 131.89, WHEATME - 136.43, WHEATPR
SCALAR

REVENUE

134.61, WHEATCL - 129.56,
134.93, WHEATLX - 116.73,
114.06, WHEATWA - 128.51 /

/ 5000000 /

VARIABLES

MIX(ACTIVITIES)
TCOST

Mix of production activities
Value of objective function

POSITIVE VARIABLE MIX

E(}UATIONS
TOTALR

Revenue Calculation & Constraint

CAP(RESOURCES)

Capacity Constrainta
Accounting: Costs;

TOTALC

TOTALR..
SUM(ACTIVITIES, RECEIPTS(ACTIVITIES) * MIX(ACTIVITIES)) -G- REVENUE;
CAP(RESOURCES).. SUM(ACTIVITIES, LANDUSE(ACTIVITIES, RESOURCES) * MIX(ACTIVITIES)) -L+ RHS(RESOURCES);

TOTALC..
TCOST -E- SUM(ACTIVITIES, COSTS(ACTIVITIES) * MIX(ACTIVITIES));
MODEL WHTCNS No Till Coat Problem / ALL /; SOLVE WHTCNS MINIMIZING TCOST USING LP;

Figure AJ. Linear programming modei for conservation wheat
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STITLE MLHA 134 WHEAT MODEL - CONVENTIONAL TILLAGE
SOFFUPPER
SETS

ACTIVITIES Each crop as produced on a specific soil type
/ WHEATAD, WHEATBI, WHEATCA, WHEATCL, WHEATCV, WHEATFA, WHEATGR,
WHEATLX, WHEATLO, WHEATME, WHEATPR, WHEATWA /
RESOURCES

/ ADLER, BIRDS. CALLOMAT, COLLINS, CONVENT, FALAYA, GRENADA,
LEXINGTON, LORRING, MEMPHIS, PROV, WAVERLY /
TABLE LANDUSECACTIVITIES, RESOURCES)

Land use by crop and soil type

ADLER BIRDS CALLOWAY COLLINS CONVENT FALAYA GRENADA LEXINGTON LORRING MEMPHIS PROV WAVERLY
WHEATAD

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

WHEATBI

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

WHEATCA

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

WHEATCn.

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

WHEATCV

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

WHEATFA

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

WHEATGR

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

WHEATLX

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

WHEATLO

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

WHEATME

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

WHEATPR

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

WHEATWA

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1
0

PARAMETERS

RECEIPTS(ACTIVITIES)

Total Receipts (Dollars Per Acre)

/ WHEATAD - 176.80, WHEATBI - 000.00, WHEATCA - 170.00, WHEATCL
WHEATCV
WHEATLO

122.40, WHEATFA - 122.40, WHEATCHl - 176.80, WHEATLX
190.40, WHEATME - 183.60, WHEATPR - 142.80, WHEATWA

176.80,
180.20,
000.00 /

RES(RESOURCES)

/ ADLER - 8881, BIRDS - 5609, CALLOWAY - 38327, COLLINS - 59360,
CONVENT - 3739, FALAYA - 78991, GRENADA - 73382, LEXINGTON - 7011,
LORRING - 108903, MEMPHIS - 28511, PROV - 18229, WAVERLY - 36457 /
COSTS(ACTIVITIES) Costs (Dollars Per Acre)
/ WHEATAD - 101.57, WHEATBI - 116.54, WHEATCA
WHEATCV - 115.96, WHEATFA - 118.94, WHEATGR
WHEATLO ■> 119.15, WHEATME - 123.69, WHEATPR
SCALAR

REVENUE

121.87, WHEATCL - 116.82,
122.19, WHEATLX - 103.99,
101.32, WHEATWA - 115.77 /

/ 5000000 /

VARIABLES

MIX(ACTIVITIES)
TCOST

Mix of production activities
Value of objective function

POSITIVE VARIABLE MIX

EQUATIONS
Revenue Calculation & Constraint

TOTALR

CAP(RESOURCES)
TOTALC

Capacity Constraints
Accounting;
Costs;

TOTALR..
SUM(ACTIVITIES, RECEIPTS(ACTIVITIES) * MIX(ACTIVITIES)) -G- REVENUE;
CAP(RESOURCES).. SUM(ACTIVITIES, LANDUSE(ACTIVITIES, RESOURCES) * MIX(ACTIVITIES)) -L+ RHS(RESOURCES);

TOTALC. .
TCOST -E- SUM(ACTIVITIES, COSTS(ACTIVITIES) * MIX(ACTIVITIES));
MODEL WHTCNV Conventional Till Cost Problem / ALL /; SOLVE WHTCNV MINIMIZING TCOST USING LP;

Figure A.6. Linear programming model for conventionai tiiiage wheat.
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